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Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal  
Editorial Vol13 No 2 – 2012 
Guest Editor for 2012 Chris Galloway, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne 
 I am writing this editorial at the conclusion of the remarkably successful World Public Relations Forum(WPRF) 
held in Melbourne. Of special note was the Research Colloquium day attended by over 100 academics and 
practitioners. The Colloquium, a Melbourne initiative,  was held as a curtain raiser to the Forum and has been 
embraced by the next 2014 WPRF  organisers in Madrid. 
Papers presented to the Colloquium have now been submitted for publication in the APPRJ and Journal of 
Communication Management for 2013. It is with great pleasure that the APPRJ will be able to publish selected 
papers that covered and wide breadth of scholarship in most areas of public relations research. 
The articles in this  final volume for 2012 reflects a variety of practice and academic research. Dr Damian 
Gleeson’s biographical study of Australian public relations pioneer George Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald is hailed in some 
academic texts as the ‘first’ PR practitioner in Australia. His sensational meant that he would certainly leave a 
lasting impression on public relations. Gleeson remarks that his latter activities involving gambling may have 
irreparably damages his career speculation could be given to the harm he may have done to the profession in his 
own state of New South Wales. 
For many of us delivering  a ‘Western’ based curriculum to an international cohort can be challenging. Dr Gregor 
Halff’s papers elicits understanding of the challenges in this situation. Brady and Vidyarini, in their paper, focus on  
area rarely examined in current public relations literature – diplomacy and in particular use a case study approach 
to observe how this activity meets concepts of public relations. 
The controversial issue of Coal Seam gas is the focus of Jaques and Galloway’s paper. A broad overview of 
activism is included but  specifically within this issue the role of the Lock the Gate Alliance is considered  and 
delivers findings that potentially question  the traditional methods employed in activism. Practitioner Sasha Grebe’s 
article also adopts a case study approach and examines the Australian Wheat Board’s response to the Royal 
Commission into the UN Oil-for Food programme. Despite the negativity surrounding the Commission outcomes 
Grebe’s perspective  also takes into account the contemporaneous restructure of the AWB and the strategy pursued 
by the organisation. 
The work undertaken by the Hunter Institute for Mental Health has led to significant research outcomes and 
provided public relations teachers with curriculum resources that can be applied across a variety of  teaching areas 
in undergraduate programs. The development of Mindframe for public relations has involved PR academics from a 
variety of institutions over a significant period of time. This paper presents the curriculum activity conclusions and 
the  rationale for those conclusions. 
I would like to record my appreciation for the fine work undertaken by my colleague Dr Chris Galloway who in 
2013 undertakes an academic  role at Massey University. I am certain his scholastic leadership will continue to be 
recognised and appreciated by public relations academics in the Asia Pacific region.   
Mark Sheehan,  
Editor, APPRJ,  
Deakin University, Australia 
December 2012 
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George William Sydney Fitzpatrick1 (1884-1948):  
An Australian Public Relations ‘pioneer’ 
 
Damian John Gleeson 
University of New South Wales 
 
 
Abstract 
Public relations scholarship has only briefly mentioned George Fitzpatrick, an Australian industry pioneer. This paper – 
based largely on archival material, contemporary articles, and other published primary sources – seeks to redress this gap in 
PR historiography. It examines Fitzpatrick’s family background, business networks, and diverse career, which included PR 
and government lobbying activities at a time when publicity practice in Australia was thought to be confined to the film sector. 
From journalist origins, Fitzpatrick moved into consultancy and pro bono PR work on behalf of governments, business, and 
charitable organisations. His PR campaigns, grounded in research trips to America and Europe in the 1930s, reflected 
considerable understanding of the ‘science of persuasion’ to influence public opinion. Fitzpatrick’s strategies included 
editorial, direct mail, advertising, events, and lobbying. In 1946 Fitzpatrick faced sensational allegations concerning his 
gambling businesses, from which he does not appear to have recovered. This paper concludes that although Fitzpatrick’s 
reputation was strongly damaged, his earlier charitable and political campaigns encapsulated PR practices well prior to the 
professional PR era in Australia. 
 
 
Keywords: Canberra, Gambling, Government, Lobbying, Public Relations, Tasmania 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1948, shortly before the formation of the (Sydney-based) Australian Institute of Public Relations2, 
George Fitzpatrick, credited as Australia’s ‘first’ public relations practitioner, died in Sydney (Potts, 1976; Tymson 
& Sherman, 2009). According to Australia’s first professor of public relations, Fitzpatrick ‘did not live to see the 
PR field he had pioneered progress to accepted respectability and assume professional status’ (Potts, 1976, 25). The 
little coverage about Fitzpatrick notes his registration as a ‘practitioner in public persuasion and propaganda’ in the 
1940s (Tymson & Sherman, 2009, 35). Some Australian PR historical accounts have not included him (Quarles & 
Rowlings, 1993; Zawawi, 2009); similarly he is absent in critiques of lobbying in Australia (Lloyd, 1991; Sheehan, 
2012). It is puzzling that Fitzpatrick, who featured in selective edition of Who’s Who in Australia (1935-1948), did 
not earn an entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography. 
 
Australian PR historiography has traditionally emphasised several watershed events: the arrival of General 
Douglas McArthur, accompanied by a large PR team in 1942 (Zawawi, 2009; Turnbull, 2010; Tymson & Sherman, 
2009) and the 1949 AIPR formation, ‘regarded as the official start of public relations as a profession in Australia’ 
(Tynan, 2011, 141). Mark Sheehan is perhaps the first scholar to have begun the important task of revisiting 
Australian PR historiography (2007; 2009). His research, which includes uncovering federal government publicity 
campaigns pre-1950, highlighted ‘paucity in recording early public relations efforts’ (Sheehan, 2007, 20). 
Macnamara and Crawford note that there are ‘... major gaps in understanding of the role and functions of public 
relations in Australia (2011, 19). Gleeson has begun to revise the early decades of PR tertiary education in 
Australia (2012a; 2012b). This paper seeks to detail Fitzpatrick’s diverse and extensive career, which pre-dates the 
beginning of the more formalised professional PR era, which began with the AIPR’s formation. A range of archival 
sources and published primary sources form the backdrop of this study. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Variously expressed as FitzPatrick. For consistency, Fitzpatrick is adopted in this paper. 
2
 Joined Victoria, South Australia and Queensland chapters to form the federated Public Relations  
   Institute of Australia in 1960. 
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Family 
 
 
George William Sydney Fitzpatrick, born in 1884, was the eldest child of Joseph Alexander Fitzpatrick, a 
‘prominent member of the Loyal Orange Order’ (Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter SMH], 3 August 1932, 15) and 
Lizzie Jones. The Fitzpatricks, an Anglican family, lived at Westmead, near Parramatta, NSW. In memory of their 
mother, George and brother, Edwin, paid for one of the bells at St John’s Cathedral, Parramatta. Edwin, a qualified 
pharmacist and physician, worked for quite a few years as a medical missionary in Central Africa (Mercury, 
1September 1941, 4). When their father, Joseph, died, his obituary emphasised the family’s association with the 
church and Joseph’s strong support of charities, including the Parramatta Mental Hospital (SMH, 5 August 1932, 
13). 
 
From an early age George Fitzpatrick displayed a flair for business, writing and promotion. As a teenager, 
he took over editing the parish paper at St John’s Cathedral and quickly turned the publication into a profit (Sun, 4 
July 1943, ‘Fact’, 4). In 1901, Fitzpatrick began full time work as a telegraph messenger for the Post Master 
General’s Department (Canberra Times, 2 August 1948, 2). He then moved into journalism and after completing 
training as a copy-boy at the Sunday Times, Fitzpatrick was appointed the paper’s district correspondent for 
Parramatta. In an early sign of entrepreneurial spirit, he encouraged young boys to report sports results: he paid 
them 4s, and unsold the information for 5s (Sun, 4 July 1943, ‘Fact’, 4). 
 
Between 1910 and 1914 Fitzpatrick worked at the Sydney Morning Herald, The Sun and Evening News 
(Who’s Who in Australia 1935, 181). He was a member of the Australian Journalists’ Association, and became 
editor and also part-owner of newspapers, including being deputy governor of the Sunday Times and director of the 
Referee (Cairns Post, 10 September 1929, 4). Fitzpatrick was also involved in Dominion Publishing Agency, the 
NSW Advertising Men’s Institute and the Direct Mail Advertising Association of Australia.  
 
In 1912, George married Gertrude Lowe at Parramatta and they had three children: George Jones, Edwin 
Albert, and Jean Marguerite. Whilst residing at Parramatta, George was appointed a Justice of the Peace (The 
Cumberland Argus & Fruitgrowers Advocate, 24 October 1914, 4). In the same year he began a role with the NSW 
Wheat Board. 
 
 
Patriotic Service 
 
 
After leaving the public service Fitzpatrick became involved in a myriad of causes and organisations. He 
was not shy in contacting – and utilising the press – to advance both himself and his clients. From his father, 
Fitzpatrick inherited strong patriotic sentiment towards the British Empire. In 1918, George became secretary of 
one such group, the Sydney Millions Club. Established in 1912, the club had a ‘belief that accelerated British 
migration would make Sydney the first Australian city to reach a population of one million’ (Spearritt, 1988). 
Fitzpatrick’s role included writing and producing the club’s newspaper (SMH, 11 March 1920, 5) and supporting 
returned servicemen, notably ANZACs. (Nepean Times, 24 May 1919, 5; SMH, 24 May 1919; SMH, 31 May 
1918). In 1920 Fitzpatrick resigned as secretary, but remained a club member for another two decades.  In 1939, 
after a study trip to the United States, Fitzpatrick gave an address to the Millions Club entitled ‘Will America 
fight?’’ in relation to World War Two (SMH, 28 August 1939, 7). After leaving the club’s employ, Fitzpatrick 
became an associate director of the Tivoli Theatre for a short period. 
 
Another patriotic group that Fitzpatrick joined was the Royal Society of St George. He mixed with 
influential business members and in December 1921 was elected secretary-manager of this group, whose aims were 
to ensure strong ties with the British Empire. The Society, through Fitzpatrick, made a public appeal for advice on 
the ‘desirability of having a fixed date to commemorate the death of Jesus Christ...’ (SMH, 30 December 1921, 9). 
By the mid 1930s Fitzpatrick would be the organisation’s chairman (SMH, 15 April 1922, 12; SMH,10 December 
1934, 4). Elite political and business leaders, many of whom belonged to Masonic Lodges, attended the Society, 
providing further networking opportunities for Fitzpatrick. It would not be until the 1940s that George Fitzpatrick 
declared his Masonic membership (Who’s Who in Australia 1947). 
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Fundraising Campaigns 
 
 
From the 1920s Fitzpatrick became involved in charitable and community services. He undertook 
fundraising campaigns on behalf of a number of Sydney hospitals. Between 1920 and 1922 he was entrusted to 
undertake a $100,000 fundraising campaign for Sydney Hospital. After one appeal he publicly thanked Sydney’s 
business community: 
 
From calculations I have made comparing Sydney on a population basis with other capital cities both in 
America and England, the figures show that the business men of this State are keenly conscious of their civic 
responsibilities (Fitzpatrick, 1921). 
 
In 1921 Fitzpatrick joined the St Margaret’s Hospital ‘men’s committee’. Within a short time his powers of 
persuasion had convinced the Catholic hospital to appoint him as their campaign director, with a weekly salary of 
£20. Prominent historian, Sister Margaret Press, described Fitzpatrick as ‘an energetic man of entrepreneurial 
experience...’ (1994, 33). The St Margaret’s post was surprising for several reasons: first, the House Committee at 
Sydney Hospital had expressed concern at some of Fitzpatrick’s methods, which combined with uncertainty about 
the campaign’s viability, led to Fitzpatrick’s resignation from Sydney Hospital in March 1922 (SMH, 19 August 
1922, 7); second, Williams Fitzsimmons, a state Liberal MP, sought to have Fitzpatrick prevented from 
undertaking further fundraising campaigns (Mercury, 25 August 1922, 9); and, third, Fitzpatrick’s Masonic 
affiliation seems at odds with the Catholic philosophy of St Margaret’s. Sectarianism was rife in Sydney in the 
1920s, exemplified by the nationalist Fuller Government which was ‘not just Protestant [but] militantly Protestant 
and anti-Catholic’(Hogan, 1987, 190). 
 
At St Margaret’s, Fitzpatrick changed his title to ‘Finance Director’ and on several occasions claimed to be 
either the hospital’s Deputy-Chairman or Chairman. Fitzpatrick set up a city office, supported by May Sheehan, the 
hospital’s newly appointed finance secretary (SMH, 25 January 1922, 9; St Margaret’s Annual Report, 1922). 
Within a couple of years, ‘Fitzpatrick had masterminded increasingly productive schemes which raised up to 
£14,000 a year’ (Press, 1994, 37). Yet, on at least one occasion, Sheehan, who would become integral to 
Fitzpatrick’s companies for more than a quarter of a century, had to publicly defend Fitzpatrick’s high fundraising 
costs (Sheehan, 1927). 
 
In 1934, following some articles in The Bulletin about Fitzpatrick selling raffle tickets illegally in New 
Zealand, the NSW government tightened the Charitable Collections Act, which restricted St Margaret’s fundraising 
endeavours (Press, 1994, 38). In combination with other financial conflicts with hospital management, Fitzpatrick 
and Sheehan resigned from St Margaret’s. Before doing so they had arranged appointments as superintendent and 
executive secretary respectively of the ‘new’ St Margaret’s Hospital, which they renamed the New South Wales 
Community Hospital (now The Langton Centre), and operated independently. 
 
Fizpatrick also held roles as secretary, president and superintendent of the Food for Babies Fund (FBF). In 
1924, FBF became responsible for the operation of Dalwood Home which offered a holiday for underprivileged 
children while their mothers were in hospital (History of Dalwood). In 1928 the facility was renamed Dalwood 
Health Home (SMH, 24 November 1928, 12). However, in 1930 the FBF foundress found it necessary to make the 
following statement in the fund’s Annual Report: 
To correct an impression that it is erroneous as it is extensive the Honorary Treasurer [May Sheehan] 
desires it on record to say that the chairman, Mr George Fitzpatrick is an honorary officer. Mr Fitzpatrick 
receives no salary, bonus, honorarium or gratuity in any shape or form. Mr and Mrs Fitzpatrick are both 
generous contributors to the Fund (Food for Fund Annual Report, 1930). 
Perhaps this statement was necessary because the fund’s financial statements that year showed £2058 spent 
on stationary, stamps, advertising and publicity, a similar amount to the £2097 spent on salaries and wages (Food 
for Fund Annual Report, 1930). In the depths of the 1930s Great Depression, the FBF provided free milk to 
hundreds of children attending kindergartens in Sydney and inner-city areas (SMH, 4 July 1933, 13). Dalwood 
experienced financial pressures, which led Fitzpatrick to made public appeals for government and private financial 
support (SMH, 28 November 1932; 3; SMH, 31 August 1933, 15; SMH, 5 October 1937, 7; SMH, 5 December 
1938, 15; SMH, 26 February 1940, 9). Fitzpatrick made headlines when he said that ‘there are dogs that receive a 
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balanced diet superior to that of many children in the community’ (SMH, 15 September 1937, 10).What Fitzpatrick 
did not explain is why advertising and publicity soaked up so many funds. In 1935, for example, Dalwood’s deficit 
of nearly £1,600, included some £547 spent on advertising and publicity, the second largest expense item after 
salaries (Dalwood Health Home Annual Report, 1935). 
 
 
Political Campaigns 
Canberra 
 
 
Fitzpatrick’s first significant PR campaign involved supporting the establishment of Canberra as 
Australia’s national capital.  In 1908 a decision had been made to create a permanent capital in Canberra, which 
would require the temporary Parliament to move from Melbourne. In 1919, Fitzpatrick became foundation 
secretary of a Sydney-based Australian Federal Capital League (AFCL), a lobby group formed to respond to 
considerable anti-Federal sentiment in Melbourne and less populated Australian states. The AFCL campaign was 
necessary because ‘... the press of Victoria were on the whole vigorously virulent. They ridiculed and sneered at the 
movement inaugurated by the Australian Federal Capital League’ (Federal Capital Pioneer, 1 February 1925, 2).  
 
Fitzpatrick played a strong advocacy role, combining lobbying and PR abilities, to promote Canberra. 
‘Persistent propaganda and external vigilance were two of the means adopted for formulating public opinion’ 
(Federal Capital Pioneer, 1 February 1925, 2). At one public meeting in Queanbeyan, Fitzpatrick spoke 
passionately about arresting Melbourne’s position and holding politicians to account (Queanbeyan Age and 
Queanbeyan Observer, 5 August 1919, 2). ‘Melbourne’, he said, ‘pretended to ignore the capital movement, and it 
was this pretence that had called into being the Federal Capital League’ (Queanbeyan Age and Queanbeyan 
Observer, 5 August 1919, 2). Fitzpatrick engaged in considerable correspondence with Federal Government 
representatives, community groups, and also convened or spoke at public meetings in favour of federalism. When a 
new Federal Minister for Works and Railways was appointed, Fitzpatrick travelled to Melbourne to garnish 
support. Upon return to Sydney, Fitzpatrick advised the League’s executive that: ‘although a Victorian’ the 
minister was ‘a warm supporter of the Federal capital movement’ (Melbourne Argus, 13 February 1923, 9). 
Ever alert to PR opportunities, Fitzpatrick suggested to the Federal government that events be held to 
signify milestones, such as the construction of schools or the sale of land (Chapman, 1924; Fitzpatrick, 1923). The 
AFCL ‘is very anxious that the first sale [of land] at Canberra should be a spectacular success’, Fitzpatrick (1924) 
wrote. In 1926, on the eve of re-location, Fitzpatrick made strident representations to government (Fitzpatrick 
1926a; 1926b; 1926c). He advised the Minister for Home Affairs and Territories that there is a ‘fear here that an 
attempt will be made by those opposed to the removal to make Canberra merely the nominal and not the actual 
capital (Fitzpatrick, 1926a). 
 
By the late 1920s Fitzpatrick described himself as a public relations consultant. The first recorded use of 
the phrase occurred when he visited North Queensland to discuss trade and tariff matters in 1929. Fitzpatrick spoke 
‘forcefully’ in support of the local sugar industry’s quest to retain tariffson imported products (Cairns Post, 10 
September 1929, 4). In an overview of the development of public opinion campaign and tactics to effect change, 
Fitzpatrick discussed some overseas precedents: 
In America and to a lesser degree in Europe, the creation of public opinion was entrusted to highly-skilled 
specialists, who never appear in public. The created public opinion by means of the power of the Press, 
letters, large advertising space, cartoons, letter writing campaigns, lobbying and co-ordinating the support 
of Chambers of Manufacturers and Chambers of Commerce which secure the desired effect (Fitzpatrick, 
cited in the Cairns Post, 10 September 1929, 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Capitalist Promoters’ 
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In July 1933 Fitzpatrick formalised his PR business by registering his company in NSW (George 
Fitzpatrick Limited, 1933a). The subscribers (shareholders) also included his wife, Gertrude, brother, Edwin, Janet 
Nolan, an advertising agent, and his secretary, May Sheehan (George Fitzpatrick Limited, 1933b). The firm’s 
public officer and secretary was his daughter, Jean (Bloomfield). Reflecting Fitzpatrick’s broad-based business 
interests, the firm’s objects included ‘advising’ individuals or companies seeking to extend their business activities, 
being an ‘advertising contractor and agent’, and transacting ‘business as capitalist promoters and financial and 
monetary agents both in the state of NSW and elsewhere’ (ibid). 
 
Two years later, the company amended its Memorandum of Association by inserting the following clause 
in its Objects: 
To carry on business of Public Relations Consultancy, and by propaganda on behalf of approved groups 
individuals and causes, to mould public opinion (George Fitzpatrick Limited, 1935; Fitzpatrick, Jean, 
1936). 
 
On the firm’s letterhead, Fitzpatrick detailed his main PR services: ‘Public Relations Counselling, 
Advertising Analysts, Business Builders, and Political Observers and Advocates’ (George Fitzpatrick Limited, 
1936).  PR counselling focused on ‘propaganda... to mould public opinion... [along] lines adopted successfully by 
governments and industries, both in Europe and America’ (ibid).  In terms that might now be recognised as public 
affairs or lobbying, Fitzpatrick said that his firm could ‘supply reports which summarise projected legislation, 
explaining its bearing on persons affected ... [and] skilled presentation of facts to Parliament...’ (ibid). Fitzpatrick’s 
letterhead at this time also contained the following quote from American academic, Everitt Dean Martin: ‘Public 
opinion can be manufactured to-date, in exactly the same way as bricks’ (ibid). 
 
In 1937 the company became Proprietary Limited and by then also had offices in Brisbane, Melbourne, 
Launceston and Hobart. Recognising the importance of the federal parliament and lobbying, Fitzpatrick had 
established an office in the Federal (Australian) Capital Territory in 1935 (Examiner, 19 September 1935, 6). This 
was the first PR consultancy in Canberra, and pre-dates the decision by Eric White and Associates (EWA) to 
establish a Canberra base by several decades (Lloyd, 1991, 11; Sheehan, 2012, 9). 
 
In the early 1940s, Fitzpatrick’s firm employed former politicians, such as Labor’s Thomas Davies Mutch 
(NSW Parliament). In 1941, after his brother’s death, Fitzpatrick appointed his two sons as directors of the firm. 
The letterhead proudly proclaimed ‘The First Incorporated PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSULTANTS [original text] 
in the Commonwealth’ (George Fitzpatrick Pty Limited, 1943). The letterhead’s rear contained in pamphlet style 
‘The Science of Persuasion’ under which fell seven areas of service on offer: PR Consultants, business builders, 
Propagandists, publicists, Advertising Analysts, Reportable Speeches, and Observes and Advocates (See Plate A). 
 
 
‘Ambassador for Tasmania’  
 
 
In the early decades of the twentieth century most state governments recognised the need for publicity 
officers. Publicity officers often worked directly for the premier (or prime minister) of the day. New South Wales 
had set the precedent with the appointment of Ernest Harpur as publicity officer in its Premier’s Department in 
March 1914 (NSW Public Service Lists, 1914). Reflecting his ‘professional’ categorisation, Harpur’s annual 
starting salary of £600 made him one of the highest paid public servants at the time. A ‘small Publicity and 
Research Branch’ was established in 1917. The publicity officer’s task included compiling Australian legislation 
and distributing it widely (History of the NSW Premier’s Department, n.d. 7) and also seeking to co-ordinate and 
monitor government expenditure on advertising (Harpur, 1916, 1920a, 1920b). 
 
A publicity office was established in Tasmania in 1935, with H.W. Blackwood fulfilling the roles of 
‘Publicity Officer, shorthand writer and private secretary to the premier’ (The Examiner, 17 January 1936, 6). 
Tasmania’s distance from the ‘mainland’, however, hampered communication, business and trade opportunities. In 
1939 the Tasmanian Government made a second appointment when it appointed George Fitzpatrick as its PR 
consultant in Sydney. The Tasmanian premier said Fitzpatrick was a ‘skilled publicity specialist’(Examiner, 13 
Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal, Vol 13(2), 2012 
 
7 
 
December 1939, 6). An article in the Burnie Advocate highlighted Fitzpatrick as the ‘founder and managing 
directorof George Fitzpatrick Ltd, the first incorporated public relations consultancy in Australia’ (17 November 
1939, 6). It also noted that Fitzpatrick had already represented Tasmanian interests in England and other Australian 
states and was known on the mainland as ‘The Ambadassor for Tasmania’ (Advocate, 17 November 1936, 6). 
Fitzpatrick’s appointment was the first in Australia and reflected similar appointments made by the British 
Government in other countries (Mercury, 17 November 1939, 3). Between 1939 and 1946 Fitzpatrick, in an 
official, though honorary role, had responsibility for ‘facilitating and where required carrying out the useful 
publicity for the state as instructed by the [Tasmanian] government...’ (Examiner, 13 December 1939, 6). 
 
Public affairs and lobbying became central to Fitzpatrick’s early work. He publicised, for example, that 
Tasmanian premier, Dwyer Gray would step aside to become the state’s Governor, as per an earlier agreement with 
the premier-elect, Robert Cosgrove (Barrier Miner, 4 December 1939, 4). Fitzpatrick was the eyes and ears for 
Tasmanian interests andzealous in advocacy. He organised events and facilitated trade opportunities on behalf of 
Tasmania. Sydney and Melbourne-based business leaders visited Tasmania, due to his persistence, such as the 1941 
visit by M.F. Martin, the managing director of Sulphates Ltd and a representative of the Federal Government’s 
review on deposits of bauxite throughout Australia (Examiner, 4 October 1941, 6).  
 
In 1942, Fitzpatrick organised a high level gathering of politicians and dignitaries in Sydney to celebrate 
the 300
th
 anniversary of the discovery of Tasmania (Mercury, 28 November, 1942, 6). In the same year the 
Tasmanian Labor Government proposed that Fitzpatrick be remunerated for hiswork and travel. The conservative 
opposition criticised the need for an interstate PR representative when ‘almost every week Ministers visited the 
Mainland on public business and Tasmanian members of the Federal Cabinet should be able to attend to the work 
attributed to Mr Fitzpatrick’ (Mercury, 5 November 1942, 8).The Legislative Council voted against the proposal. 
 
 
Postal Reforms 
 
 
From the late 1920s George Fitzpatrick advocated reductions in postal rates both within Australia and mail 
headed for overseas destinations. He organised activities under the ‘Postal Progress Association’ (Fitzpatrick, 
1928). In the mid 1930s the association was renamed Postal Reduction League. In 1936 Fitzpatrick visited 
Launceston, seeking support to establish a Tasmanian branch (Advocate, 18 November 1936, 5). 
 
World War Two necessitated government taxation, so a patriotic Fitzpatrick shelved the postal reform 
campaign until after the war. As ‘honorary director of Public Relations’ and later Chairman of the (re-named) 
Postal Reform League, he said that ‘Taxation will be reduced if sufficient people make known their demands to 
their parliamentary representative’ (Fitzpatrick, 1946a). The League sought to ‘abolish the last “temporary” war-
time tax of a halfpenny, have all first-class mail within the Commonwealth carried by air without surcharge, reduce 
telephone rates, either by eliminating the charge for installation or reducing the cost of calls’ (Werribee Shore 
Banner, 17 April 1947, 1). Fitzpatrick’s message was that it was ‘economically immoral for a great social service 
like the Post Office to be used as a revenue-raising activity... postal profits should be used for postal services only’ 
(Fitzpatrick, 1946b, 2).  He also urged people to ‘protest by having resolutions carried by the civic authorities ...’ 
(Morwell Advertiser, 4 April 1946, 4). 
 
 
 
1946 Crisis 
 
 
Two years before his death, Fitzpatrick experienced a crisis that would severely impact on his reputation 
(and his PR consultancy). Some concerns about his gambling businesses in Tasmania had been publicly raised as 
early as 1922 (Sydney), 1935 (Western Australia), and 1942 (Tasmania). The Mirror (Perth), for example, urged its 
readers not to accept any unsolicited tickets from Fitzpatrick-controlled companies: Prudent Investments Pty Ltd of 
Investment Pty Ltd (28 September 1935, 11). In 1942 the Tasmanian Liberal Opposition directly linked Fitzpatrick 
to these companies ‘selling tickets in sweeps’. 
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In February 1946 a Tasmanian independent MP tabled a parliamentary motion calling for an inquiry into 
donations to political parties, and the Liberal Party raised specific concerns about donations by vested business 
interests, such as Fitzpatrick, to a ‘secret fund’ kept by the Labor Party leader in Tasmania (Advocate, 26 February 
1948, 1; Mercury, 10 March 1948, 1). Between August and November 1946, Sydney’s Smith’s Weekly (Smith’s), 
following a detailed investigation, including company searches in Tasmania, published a serious of damming 
articles about Fitzpatrick and his Tasmanian-based gambling companies, which were predominantly administered 
from Sydney. Smith’s initial article, which did not mention Fitzpatrick, criticised the 1935 Gaming Act (Tasmania), 
which allowed private business to sell Tattersall’s gambling tickets at a 50 per cent profit on the price set by the 
Tasmanian Treasury (SW, 1946a). Smith’s conceded that while there was ‘nothing illegal’, the companies operate 
under ‘ridiculously generous regulation’ to maximise their profits (SW, 1946a). 
 
Subsequent articles focused heavily on the ‘urbane’ Fitzpatrick, who lived ‘behind a facade of suburban 
respectability... ’ (SW, 1946i). Dramatic headlines included ‘The Vile Trade of George Fitzpatrick: “Smith’s” 
Unmasks this Public Relations Consultant’; ‘Despicable Shams of George Fitzpatrick’; ‘How George Fitzpatrick 
gets away with it’; and, ‘What becomes of £13,500 Fitzpatrick?’ (SW, 1946b, 1946f; 1946g; 1946i). Smith’s 
accused Fitzpatrick of a ‘dual character and personality’ (SW, 1946h; SW,1946i). It targeted the operations of 
Prudent Investors and Investments Pty Ltd, which not only ran an ‘elaborate gambling racket’ through the sale of 
Tattersall’s, but also exploited ‘lonely, country people... by methods of astrology, ‘lucky’ boloney and similar 
duplicity’ (SW, 1946b; 1946c,1946i). The reference to ‘lucky’ probably referred to “Lucky Fred’s”, another 
gambling business that Fitzpatrick’s associate May Sheehan had purchased in 1938 (SW, 1946b). 
 
Smith’s called for the Postmaster General’s Department to review its Act so as to bring to an end 
Fitzpatrick’s mail-order gambling business, which operated across Australia from a Sydney GPO box. It also called 
upon the Postal Reform League, of which Fitzpatrick was a senior member, to ‘change its “attack” to prevent 
George Fitzpatrick’s gambling companies from using mails in contravention of the spirit of Section 57 of the Post 
and Telegraph Act’(SW, 1946i). The same GPO box in Sydney, Smith’s claimed, was the outlet for astrological 
readings (SW, 1946b). 
 
The articles came to the attention of the Tasmanian opposition and media (Advocate, 2 October 1946, 2; 
Mercury, 2 October 1946, 6). One opposition member labelled Fitzpatrick a ‘human parasite’ (Mercury, 16 October 
1946, 16). Tasmania’s Labor premier, (later Sir) Robert Cosgrove, attempted to downplay Fitzpatrick’s PR role: 
‘he offers assistance to the government, mainly by sending us newspaper cuttings of any matter that he thinks 
might be of interest to Tasmania’ (cited in SW, 1946b). A motion in the Tasmanian Legislative Council called upon 
the government to ‘sever all relations with George Fitzpatrick, Honorary, Public Relations Officer...’ (Mercury, 23 
October 1946, 22). During this crisis, the highly experienced promoter became publicity-shy. Fitzpatrick did not 
comment, and it is unknown if Smith’s asked Fitzpatrick to do so. For the first time in his highly successful PR 
career, Fitzpatrick faced a significant, and intensely personal, PR crisis. A friend, Labor MP for Bondi (NSW), 
Abram Landa, repudiated attacks on Fitzpatrick claiming that he ‘... had given generously to many charities and 
was too ill to defend himself’ (SMH, 29 November 1946, 5). With no other public supporters and an ugly 
parliamentary debate that could impact on the Cosgrove administration, Fitzpatrick resigned from the voluntary 
post. 
 
The resignation may have saved the Cosgrove government in the short term, as well as Fitzpatrick’s 
gambling interests, but it did not end the matter. In 1948, Cosgrove came under intense pressure. The premier’s 
denial of receiving any money from Fitzpatrick ‘since 1938’ except for £440, ‘paid as a normal contribution to 
party funds in 1947’ did little to enhance Fitzpatrick’s damaged reputation (Examiner, 10 March 1948, 3). In light 
of 21
st
 century corporate governance and ethical standards, both Fitzpatrick’s donations to Cosgrove and the 
premier’s acceptance of donations, coming after the 1946 crisis were serious lapses in judgement by both parties. It 
created an impression that the donations were payback for Cosgrove maintaining the status quo and not 
investigating Fitzpatrick’s gambling companies.  
 
The situation worsened for the premier, when in late 1947 he was charged with bribery, corruption and 
conspiracy (Townsley, 1993).While Fitzpatrick was not central to the charges, the Supreme Court Inquiry 
nevertheless raised Fitzpatrick’s donations. Under questioning as to why a ‘mainlander’ such as Fitzpatrick donated 
to the Tasmanian premier, Cosgrove replied that ‘Mr Fitzpatrick is a supporter of the Labour [sic] Party’ 
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(Launceston Examiner, 18 February 1948, 3), though omitted reference to Fitzpatrick’s gambling companies. 
Subsequently, Cosgrove was acquitted on all charges. 
 
A few months later, on 1 August 1948, George Fitzpatrick suffered a fatal heart attack at his Mosman home 
in Sydney. A small obituary in the Sydney Morning Herald (2 August 1948, 4) noted that ‘recently he was 
superintendent of NSW Community Hospital and Chairman of the Dalwood Health Homes’. The Canberra Times 
said Fitzpatrick was ‘well known’ in ‘advertising circles’. Since his retirement [he] had devoted his time to 
charitable works, and the Dalwood Home for Children’ (Canberra Times, 2 August 1948, 2). The Tasmanian press 
published similarly brief articles. 
 
In 1953, Fitzpatrick’s daughter advised the NSW Registrar General of Joint Stock Companies that ‘the 
company of George Fitzpatrick is not carrying on any business...and seeks to be dissolved (Bloomfield, 1953a). 
Clarifying correspondence advised that ‘the members have lost all interest in its [public relations] affairs...’ 
(Bloomfield, 1953b). George Fitzpatrick’s plea that his father’s original company be ‘allowed to die’ (1954) 
confirmed the family’s decision not to continue Australia’s first PR consultancy. In Tasmania, concerns about the 
corporate structure and excessive profits of Prudent Investors and Investments Pty Ltd continued to attract criticism 
from the Tasmanian Liberal opposition (Mercury, 15 October 1953, 3). The original shareholders, except the 
deceased Fitzpatrick, remained on the companies’s books, and both companies traded until ca 1960. 
 
In death, as in life, Fitzpatrick displayed generosity. Dalwood Health Home received £300. Sheehan, his 
loyal lieutenant, received the largest non-family benefit of £500, as well as other benefits (Fitzpatrick, 1948). 
Additionally, Fitzpatrick bequeathed some 10 per cent of his Last Will to non-family members. His Executors were 
asked to regard staff at Dalwood Home and the NSW Community Hospital as ‘his employees’, and those who had 
worked at either institution for more than ten years were eligible for a ‘pecuniary legacy’ (ibid). The amount to 
these employees totalled £1,300. Fitzpatrick also ensured that his Tasmanian business manager received large share 
allocations prior to his death (ibid). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
George Fitzpatrick’s career involved multiple businesses including setting up Australia’s first PR 
consultancy. In the 1920s and early 1930s Fitzpatrick made an unprecedented contribution towards the creation of 
PR practice in Australia. His modus operandi resembled aspects of public information, press agentry, lobbying and 
public affairs. In many respect he was at least a generation ahead of publicists in integrating advertising, publicity, 
events, direct mail and lobbying, and to this extent he deserves recognition as a pioneer in Australian public 
relations. To a large extent, also, he was highly successful in the field of persuasion on behalf of his clients.  
 
Fitzpatrick was entrepreneurial, affluent and highly networked. Ironically, as a Mason and ‘capitalist 
promoter’, he benefited more from an association with Irish-Australian Catholics, such as May Sheehan, St 
Margaret’s Hospital and Robert Cosgrove’s long serving Tasmanian ALP Government, than from establishment 
peers. Yet, in his non-PR businesses, the master of persuasion appears to have overlooked the importance of 
professional reputation and personal integrity. From the mid 1930s, Fitzpatrick heavily focused on gambling, which 
might have been a result of insufficient PR business?  Fitzpatrick’s (1933, 10) claim: ‘Personally I am opposed to 
gambling...and as far as I remember never had a bet’ seems somewhat disingenuous in light of extensive gambling 
interests set up at about that time. His affiliated gambling businesses suffered from questionable conduct 
(especially by today’s standards) which flowed through to his personal reputation.  
 
He ignored early warning signals about his gambling activities in Sydney (1922), Perth (1933) and 
Launceston (1942). A high public profile – built on self-promotion – could not be sustained after Smith’s Weekly 
uncovered the full extent of his gambling businesses, which, after political attacks, led to his sudden resignation 
from the Tasmanian government PR role. Fitzpatrick’s loyalty to the Cosgrove’s Labor government was admirable, 
though his political donations to the Tasmanian Premier in the wake of his own 1946 crisis reflected further lapses 
in ethical behaviour. 
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Nevertheless, throughout his career Fitzpatrick demonstrated commitment to community service. His work 
at several hospitals and charities was commendable and he seems to have been well motivated in service to children 
and families of a much lesser station in life. Unsurprisingly, obituaries praised Fitzpatrick as a ‘well known 
philanthropist’ (Canberra Times, 2 August 1948, 2). Fitzpatrick’s death might have robbed the soon to be formed 
AIPR of someone with significant understanding of ‘the science of public persuasion’at a time when PR was 
largely restricted to publicity roles. A counterfactual question is whether the fledgling AIPR would have welcomed 
Fitzpatrick, given his somewhat questionable reputation in the late 1940s? (A comparison with pioneers, such as 
the distinguished Sir Asher Joel, is outside this paper’s scope.) Whether or not George Fitzpatrick deserves 
accolade as Australia’s PR ‘pioneer’, it cannot be overlooked that he was the ‘first Australian member of the 
National Association of Public Relations Counsel Incorporated, America’ (Who’s Who in Australia 1947), a 
forerunner to the Public Relations Society of America. 
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Getting It Right From the Start: How the Initial Crisis Response by Scandalized 
Organisations is Critical to Repairing Reputational Damage 
Sasha Grebe  
Royal Australasian College of Physicians 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper draws on the case study of AWB and the United Nations Oil-For-Food scandal to examine the 
importance of the initial crisis response strategy for a scandalized organisation in framing the perceptions of 
stakeholders to the rebuilding of a damaged corporate reputation. 
 
Design/Methodology: The AWB case study is a perfect opportunity to highlight the differences between apologia 
and apology in post-crisis communication and reputation management. 
 
Findings: In seeking to avoid genuine reform of itself and the regulatory it operated in, AWB caused itself further 
reputational damage. This demonstrates the importance of getting an apology right from the outset. 
 
Research: The Royal Commission established by the Australian Government examined in great detail the approach 
taken by AWB to the “Oil-For-Food” “kickback’ scandal.  
 
Practical implications: There are numerous studies of corporate scandals and why they occur but the AWB case 
study provides a unique case study into post-crisis communication and how organisations can respond effectively 
to corporate scandals. 
 
Original value of the paper: The unique insights gained from the Australian Royal Commission investigations into 
AWB clearly show that the company initially tried to stonewall or manage through the impacts of the scandal 
without a genuine contrition and commitment to reform. As the National regulatory Affairs Manager, and 
Government Relations and Trade Advocacy Manager employed by the new management team, the author was 
intimately involved. 
 
KEYWORDS: corporate scandal, reputation management, crisis-communication, public apology, post-crisis 
response, Oil-For-Food scandal, AWB Limited. 
Introduction 
AWB Limited was the centre of the one the most infamous corporate scandals in Australia and there have 
only been a handful of companies who have been the subject of Royal Commission. In the case of AWB ‘The 
Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN Oil-For-Food Programme’ headed up former judge 
Terrence Cole, found that AWB and AWBI might have breached Australian law in relation to its dealings with 
Iraq. What made the scandal even more damaging and sensational was the politics, with then Australian Prime 
Minister called before the Inquiry and a major policy rift occurring within the Coalition Government.  
In addition to the Australian Inquiry, there had also been a United Nations Inquiry headed up by Paul 
Volker that found AWB to be the biggest international culprit in the scandal. The scandal was referred to in 
Australia as the ‘kickback scandal’ but even more damaging was the reference to the ‘wheat for weapons’ scandal, 
where the company was accused of diverting UN aid money to the regime of Saddam Hussein. In 2007, the then 
Opposition Trade Minister and future Australian Trade Minister stated in the Parliament that as a result of the 
actions of AWB “We sent our soldiers to war against an enemy that we partly funded” (Crean, 2007) 
The minority partner, the Australian National Party, split from their Coalition partners who voted on 
legislation to reform the regulatory arrangements for bulk wheat exports with the support of the Opposition in the 
Australian Parliament. As a result of the scandal, thirteen former executives faced possible criminal charges and 
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Australia’s bulk wheat export marketing arrangements, known as the Single Desk, were legislatively reformed. The 
new regulatory regime stripped AWB of its former monopoly and an open and competitive market was introduced. 
What became apparent during the scandal, was that the company appeared to initially believe that it could 
weather the storm and fashion a way to maintain the status quo of the marketing arrangements. This was found to 
patently unlikely, as the initial response by AWB to the scandal was roundly condemned and rejected as the 
legislative reform process progressed. What made matters worse for the company was the initial attempts to 
obfuscate and avoid responsibility. This was perhaps best exemplified by the development of a de-merger proposal 
that was intended to satisfy the demands for precipitous action and to manufacture a legislative response that would 
maintain the monopoly position of the company under what was known as the ‘single desk’ marketing 
arrangements.  
It was reported that the Australian Prime Minister had “reacted coolly” (Gluyas, 2006) to the initial de-
merger proposal and it was not successful in stemming the demands for AWB to be punished. The company’s 
stakeholders did not accept the initial response of the de-merger proposal as being sufficient for the scale of the 
transgression. In pursuing this flawed strategy, the company generated further damage to its corporate reputation 
and lost further credibility from the perspective of the key stakeholders that it needed to assuage if it was to fix its 
reputation and continue to operate.  
The documents provided to the Royal Commission established to investigate the United Nations “Oil-For-
Food” scandal, made it clear to many, including the Commissioner that AWB had not acted genuinely during the 
scandal. This was evidenced by the approach taken by the company to dealing firstly with the Volker inquiry and 
then the Royal Commission under former judge Terrence Cole. Commissioner Cole stated that; 
“AWB’s response to this Inquiry was one of non-cooperation, lack of frankness, and resort to litigation to 
endeavor to keep from disclosure documents and material relevant to this Inquiry. The decision to adopt 
that approach was made by the Chairman and the Board of AWB. It has caused inestimable reputational 
harm to AWB” (Cole, 2006) 
As a case study of post-crisis communication and effective reputation management following a corporate 
scandal, AWB failed to grasp the opportunity of the situation. It failed to develop a response that would meet the 
demands of the community and key stakeholders. I compounded the problem by trying to stonewall and avoid 
taking responsibility. It was also exposed as being uncooperative and disingenuous in its approach. The so-called 
apology was insincere and overall it was seen to be trying to defend itself and its position despite the growing 
demands for action and reform of the company and Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements. 
Post-Scandal Responses by Damaged Organisations 
In examining the processes of repair and re-build from the perspective of the AWB scandal, this paper 
addresses the gap identified by De Maria (2010, Sims, 2009; Watson, 2007) and others in the field on scandal 
scholarship about how a damaged organisation can progress out of a scandal. One of the options considered by 
George and Evuleocha (2003) in their examination of the Enron scandal was image and reputation restoration. The 
distinction between image and reputation goes to the heart of effective post-scandal responses. Corporate image is 
defined in corporate branding and marketing literature as what the organisation wants others to think about it, or 
what it believes they think about it, whereas reputation is what others actually do think about the organisation 
(Brown et al, 2006, pp102). Thus reputation can be seen as being more aligned with the rebuilding of a fatally 
compromised reputation from the perspective of those critical to its continued existence and financial performance. 
In looking at the unsuccessful attempts by Enron and Arthur Anderson to restore their tarnished reputations 
George and Evuleocha (2003) use the term triage as an action by companies to seize the initiative in a crisis by 
unearthing themselves any questionable practices before they are discovered by others. This action suggests that to 
be effective, organisations which are damaged by an unethical or illegal transgression must dig deeper than a repair 
of their image. To continue with the medical analogy, to effectively rebuild a damaged reputation, an organisation 
must treat the causes as well as the symptoms. In the case of AWB, the company was not left with the option of 
trying to repair its reputation. Instead it how to go about rebuilding ‘a’ new reputation as the company would never 
regain its former position but it did recover and it was able to effect a turn-around in its reputation. 
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While it is noted that the company was eventually accredited under the new bulk wheat export marketing 
arrangements, it is essentially beyond the scope of this paper to consider the long-term implications for the 
company based on its response to the scandal. However, it is important to note that the company was eventually 
reintegrated with key stakeholders, including the regulator and the government and that it was able to continue to 
operate, albeit in a different structure and operating environment. 
According to Sims (2009) how an organisation responds to a scandal will play a large part in determining if 
they are able to rebuild their reputation. Larkin states that the actions taken by the organisation, especially as they 
relate to stakeholders, will play a defining role in either exacerbating or reducing the effects of a crisis (2003, 
pp63). The importance of the post-crisis approach taken by the damaged organisation and the link to genuine 
cultural and structural reform is highlighted by Fombrun and Van Riel; 
“Overtime, some companies recover dissipated value quickly and crisis fizzles. Others experience more 
extended damage. Research suggests that the enduring difference may well lie in how the crisis is handled 
and what the reputation of the company was beforehand.” (Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004, pp 34 – 35). 
In looking at how organisations respond De Maria (2010) identifies three different types of post-crisis 
organisation based on the available literature. These being the organisations that respond positively to the trouble 
they find themselves in, those that accept governance reforms begrudgingly and finally those that miss the 
opportunities offered by the scandal to reform. De Maria goes on to define these as ‘the redemptive organisation’; 
the ‘tread water organisation’; and, the ‘rogue organisation’ (2010, pp71 – 72). The focus of this paper is firstly on 
how AWB begins as a rogue organisation, becomes a tread water organisation through its initial mishandling of the 
scandal and ultimately it’s move to becoming a redemptive organisation. 
This paper is especially concerned with the move by AWB from treading water to a redemptive 
organisation based on the organisational double-loop reflective learning and then the third-loop regulatory learning 
processes as a requirement for a genuine commitment to reform that permitted a successful rebuilding of the 
company’s reputation, especially with key stakeholders. 
The Learning Process And Forgiveness 
Implicit in much of the work on corporate crisis and even scandals, is that the organisation can ‘manage’ or 
deal with the incident or issue (Gaines-Ross, 2008; Curtin et al, 2005; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Marra, 1998; 
Seeger, 2010; Hale et al, 2005) as distinct from changing the organisation and addressing the underlying or root 
causes (Poppo and Schenker, 2010). Rhee and Kim (2010) refer to this as the distinction between superficial and 
substantive reputation repair and Alsop, (2004) writes of the deep structural basis of a positive reputation. 
Therefore crisis such as corporate scandals cannot be managed superficially. 
According to Pfarrer et al (2008) organisations that work to discover the facts of the transgression, provide 
an appropriate explanation of their wrongdoing, accept and serve an equitable punishment, and make consistent 
internal and external rehabilitative changes increase the likelihood of meeting stakeholder demands and, 
consequently, have a higher probability of successfully achieving reintegration with stakeholders than those that do 
not. This is the critical difference between single-loop reactive learning and double-loop reflective learning (De 
Maria, 2010; Sims, 2009; Stead and Smallman, 2002) where re-building requires genuine and meaningful reforms 
to successfully reintegrate the organisation.  
Real success in this process occurs with what Healy and Braithwaite refer to as the third loop, which is 
when a regulator, which in the case of AWB was Wheat Exports Australia and the Australian Consumer and 
Competition Commission, incorporate the outcomes of the organisation’s double-loop learning. Once it began to 
demonstrate genuine contrition and commitment to reform through change, AWB as a disgraced organisation was 
able to work with the Australian Government on the new wheat marketing arrangements to replace the system that 
it had effectively dismantled through its own transgression. The successful reforms of the company’s double-loop 
reflective learning enabled it to then engage with the Commonwealth Departments such as Agriculture and Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, as well as the regulators on the details of the new arrangements. In 2008 the company was 
accredited with an export license under arrangements that were strengthened following the Cole Inquiry, which 
suggests that the revised response strategy was ultimately successful in gaining forgiveness and reintegration. 
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The deeper learnings of the double-loop reflective learning process can result in more fundamental reforms 
needed for forgiveness and reintegration. These can complement the potential benefits effective crisis 
communication. If done successfully, these responses can mitigate the negative impacts of a crisis and sometimes 
even enhance an already positive reputation (Kauffman, 2005). If however an organisation fails to respond to a 
crisis in the correct manner, the damage can be greater (Marra, 1998). A perfect example of things getting worse is 
the adage that the cover up is worse than the crime, which was certainly true of the AWB response exposed during 
the Cole Inquiry. It is still critical that organisations correctly manage their initial response to a scandal or a crisis, 
or any communication for that matter. However, while this paper highlights that AWB certainly didn’t initially 
handle itself with contrition or a genuine commitment to reform, the focus here is on the post-crisis response and 
the program for recovery where the positive outcomes for AWB came from a scrapping of the old ways of doing 
business that had contributed to the unethical and potentially illegal behavior. 
Based on the complex and substantive commitments required to create and build a positive reputation, and 
what is required to protect and maintain one, Rhee and Kim state that in response to a scandal, organisations should 
engage in substantive actions to rebuild a reputation which involves changing the organisation’s behavior and 
position to remove the causes of the reputation-damaging event and prevent recurrence of similar events (2010, 
pp7). Moving beyond the management of the crisis, effective response strategies must address the causes of the 
transgression. This requires a complete and open assessment of the of the problems underlying the scandal and not 
just those resulting from the scandal, as well as the root causes and the steps proposed to resolve and treat those 
causes of the problems (Poppo and Schenker, 2010). 
The critical link between crisis management and organisational development has been explored by Lalonde 
(2007) but most of the situational analysis has been unable to include longitudinal evaluation of the medium to 
long-term responses by organisations that have resulted in the regaining of credibility and rebuilding of reputation. 
Taking Lalonde’s organisational development approach to effective rebuilding of a corporate reputation, the 
organisation must go beyond the superficial capability of issues and crisis management, to address the key elements 
of a company’s reputation. This are derived from the fundamentals elements of culture and climate, values and 
behaviors, policies and procedures. In the AWB example, the company needed to address all of these and its 
performance in reforming these areas was evaluated by the wheat export regulator as a condition of its license to 
export. 
An important piece of work in the area of restoring positive reputation was the examination by Muzellec 
and Lambkin (2004 into the tactic of rebranding to cultural change and organisational development and reform. 
They found that for many organisations, an improvement in the perceptions of the company for a short time did not 
translate in the long run into a better reputation. This suggests that cosmetic changes in response to a scandal will 
not address the underlying causes that go the heart of a genuine rebuilding program from the perspective of 
stakeholders. This was evidenced by the decision taken by the AWB management was not to ‘rebrand’ the 
company, as any new brand would still be damaged by any unresolved legacy issues and only once the company 
had been reformed could a new brand be considered. The AWB was eventually purchased and the new owner, who 
saw market value in the brand, it continues to trade with the AWB brand. Suggesting that the company might not 
have been able to recoup it loses, or recover its lost position or reputation but it was able to continue to operate. 
It is for reasons such as those outlined in the above section that Seidman (2004), suggests newly appointed 
CEOs in a discredited organisation must “take on” the challenge of developing a new reputation based on new 
culture established through positive values and principles effectively embedded into the organisation and not 
merely espoused or claimed. This was the case with Gordon Davis at AWB, who in similar manner to the 
HealthSouth case cited by Sims (2009), changed the culture of the company by riding it of its vestiges of the past, 
although in the case of AWB this was somewhat assisted by the regulatory changes legislated by the Parliament 
that removed the company’s monopoly entitlements under the ‘single desk’ wheat marketing arrangements. 
Ultimately AWB was able to move beyond the scandal and restructure the company through significant 
constitutional reform such that it was damaged but no longer scandalized through significant community outrage 
and stakeholder anger. 
The Reaction To The Initial AWB Response 
In response to the findings of the Royal Commission the company announced in July 2006 (AWBa, 2006) 
that AWBI the subsidiary of AWB Limited that held the export license would have an independent board and 
separate governance and committee structures from AWB Limited.  The Chairman of AWB International (AWBI), 
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Mr. Ian Donges, announced in September 2006 (AWBb, 2006), almost on the eve of the findings of the Royal 
Commission, that key industry good functions and dedicated staff would be transferred to AWBI as part of the 
improved governance arrangements foreshadowed a few months before. 
 
The Chairman of AWBI announced in September 2006 (AWBb, 2006) that key industry good functions 
and dedicated staff would be transferred to AWBI as part of the improved governance arrangements foreshadowed 
in July. In an attempt to bolster the governance arrangements of the single desk, AWBI was also given a separate 
management team and staff and will serve an industry good function in managing the Single Desk, including 
controlling the bulk veto and providing input on permit applications to the Wheat Export Authority (“WEA”). 
Under the model, AWBI would retain its bundled services contract with AWB Limited with the international sales 
and marketing function, and therefore related staff, to remain within AWB Limited as part of the bundled services 
contract. However it was acknowledged at the time that the changes were “operational” in nature and didn’t require 
shareholder approval (AWBb, 2006) so they could not really be considered as genuine and meaningful governance 
reform. 
The reaction to these was muted, skeptical or critical. The PGA at the time labeled the planned reforms as 
“window dressing and a sham to deflect criticism and curry favor with the Government” (Bettles, 2006). Clearly 
any response by the company would be influenced by the findings of the Royal Commission and that it would be 
difficult for the government and other stakeholders to evaluate the suitability of any proposal by AWB. It was also 
unlikely that the proportionality of the perceived punishment could not be measured until the scale of the 
transgressions was determined by the Inquiry. It is however instructive that the company would attempt to propose 
a set of measures before the findings of the Inquiry and then fail to appreciate how this might be negatively 
received by key stakeholders and the community. 
The AWBI proposal by definition didn’t address the systemic issues of unethical and illegal behaviors 
within AWB Limited. Because the company hadn’t accepted it’s part in the wrongdoing, not only couldn’t it 
propose or embark on genuine reform, it could appreciate that the AWBI response wouldn’t be accepted by salient 
stakeholders and that such  a proposal might be perceived as further evidence of the inherent organisational failings 
of the company. At the time it was reported that the Australian Prime Minister had “reacted coolly” to the proposal, 
a grain grower group referred to it as "smoke and mirrors" “a means to guarantee potential for further deception," 
and a market analyst said at the time that "It's designed to make it look as though they're doing something without 
actually doing anything," (Gluyas, 2006). 
After the release of the findings of the Royal Commission in November 2006 the Chairman immediately 
announced that a new demerger proposal under this proposal the Board of Directors would seek shareholder 
approval in 2007 to split AWB into two separate companies – a wholly grower-owned Single Desk manager, and a 
purely commercial agri-business company. These were positioned as reforms that would address the issues raised 
during the Royal commission. However the AWB de-merger proposal was seen as a “sham” by Professor Kerin 
(Farley, 2007) from Melbourne University's Business School. He was deeply skeptical of AWB's proposal to 
demerge, believing it was an exercise in political expediency to buy the company more time with the Federal 
Government in the wake of the Cole Inquiry.  
This was also the overwhelming assessment of government, who felt that these changes were too little too 
late and did not get to the heart of the fundamental and systemic problems within AWB, which were seen to be 
intrinsically linked to the monopoly arrangements. With mounting pressure not only the government and 
competitors but also individual from grain traders to get rid of the single desk the company would need to come up 
with a more compelling case that it was taking on the challenge to respond to what had been revealed by Volker 
and what was coming out in the Royal Commission. The government was not going to accept the proposed 
changes, with the Prime Minister making that clear when he said "It doesn't alter the view I expressed to the joint 
party room yesterday, and that is that the world cannot remain the same as a result of the Cole inquiry...Plainly the 
status quo can't remain" (Howard, 2006). In the Parliament, Senator Johnston stated that  
“The issue of the demerger we saw last week was not adequately explained, which says to me that this 
whole thing was simply a charade to try to look good and to be seen to be doing something” (Johnston, 
2006). 
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As noted by one commentator at the time, the underlying flaw of the AWB response and source of much 
cynicism was that the demerger proposal was predicated on the export monopoly continuing (Hopkins, 2006). 
AWB was perceived to be trying to preserve the status quo of the monopoly. This was unacceptable to the Prime 
Minister and other political figures, including the Opposition. This attempt to try and link reforms into the 
continuation of the arrangements that had contributed to the transgressions behind the scandal was poorly received 
and if successful would have largely avoided the punishment that was expected from the community and others 
critical of AWB’s behaviour. 
The Legislative Response To AWB’s Proposals 
The prevailing view of the AWB proposals in response to the Oil-For-Food scandal was that company was 
doing enough and that the status quo could not remain. If the intent of the proposals was to engineer a way for the 
company to be seen to have been punished without losing its legislative monopoly, then not only was it poorly 
received it was largely unsuccessful.  
In December 2006, the then Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Hon. Peter McGauran 
(Productivity Commission, 2011)  announced that the bulk veto, which was the key mechanism of the ‘single desk’ 
monopoly arrangements, would be transferred temporarily to the Minister. The amendments to the arrangements 
transferred AWB International’s (“AWBI”) power to veto bulk wheat exports by non-AWBI exporters to the 
Minister. AWBI was the wholly owned subsidiary of AWB Limited. These arrangements were only in place until 
legislation could be passed to enact new regulatory arrangements. At the time the Minister stated that "This is, to a 
significant degree, a compromise between those who are passionate supporters of a single desk (system) and those 
who would want instant deregulation” (AAP, 2006). 
The passage of the Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 2006 signified the impending end for the existing 
wheat marketing arrangements and therefore the futility of the strategy of AWB up until that point. The proposed 
changes to the arrangements to AWB International and then the de-merger proposal had failed to gain acceptance 
or prevent reform to the regulatory system. With the system and the company so intrinsically linked, significant 
reform to one had knock on consequences for the other. AWBN was faced with no option but to adapt and to 
change to the new wheat marketing arrangements. 
Further amendments to the Wheat Marketing Act in 2007 prepared for the complete removal of AWB’s 
involvement in the bulk single desk from 1 March 2008. In this way the Government and the Parliament was 
signalling the start date for an open and competitive market for bulk wheat exports. This paper doesn’t examine in 
detail what those new arrangement were or what the company needed to do so as to comply but it is important to 
refer to those developments in reference to the strategy until that point by AWB. 
In addition to the Wheat Marketing Amendment Act 2006, the Wheat Marketing Act 2007 and the Wheat 
Export Marketing Act 2008, there were other pieces of legislation and parliamentary debate relevant to the AWB 
scandal. One of these was the International Trade Integrity Act 2007, which the then Opposition Trade Minister, 
Simon Crean told that Parliament would “finally see the government doing something to shut the stable door that 
was left wide open while AWB officials were shovelling money into Saddam Hussein’s coffers. The bill is the 
government’s response to the wheat for weapons scandal—the payments, allowed through the government’s 
negligence, made by the Wheat Board to Saddam Hussein” (Crean, 2007). This link between the Oil-For-Food 
scandal and undermining the Australian war effort was extremely damaging to the company. It demonstrated the 
extreme levels of outrage and anger that extended beyond the disappointment of many ‘white collar’ corporate 
scandals that related to what were for many in the community abstract transgressions such as accounting 
procedures. 
AWB’s apologia response clearly failed to address what Dr. Sandman refers to as the outrage of 
transgression by organisations such as AWB in the Oil-For-Food scandal. References to “the disgraced AWB's 
single desk policy” (AAP, 2006) highlight the link between AWB and the monopoly arrangements. In speaking 
support of the 2006 Bill, Senator McGauran (brother of the Minister) made the direct connection between the 
influence of the monopoly arrangements with the unethical and/or illegal transgressions of the company when he 
stated “What is being acted out today is a consequence of that culture and that behavior” (AAP, 2006) Another 
Senator commented on the negative perceptions of AWB’s initial response to the Inquiry by stating that “AWB 
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presented a facade of cooperation with this inquiry but, in truth, it did not cooperate at all. It should be ashamed of 
itself” (Ferris, 2006). 
As a sad indictment on the unsuccessful strategy initially deployed by AWB, one Shadow Minister 
speaking in support of stripping AWB of its monopoly indicated that the AWB International proposal was too little 
too late; “A key problem of the services agreement is the fact that its contents have been kept secret from growers 
and just about everyone else. This secrecy has become a hallmark of the arrogant way in which the AWB has been 
conducting its business” (Thompson, 2006). A number of Senators (Eggleston, 2006; O’Brien, 2007) complained 
about the commercial arrangements between AWB Limited and AWB International, which the initial proposals 
from the company clearly failed to address.  
The view of Parliament and that of many stakeholders to the conduct before during and after the scandal 
was perhaps best summed by Senator Johnston (2006); 
“I pause to say that AWB has displayed contemptuous corporate culture with wheat growers, with 
shareholders—both A and B class—and with the general public. Alarmingly, the arrogance and contempt 
continues to this day, notwithstanding the commissioner’s finding. It seems to me that this company, 
amazingly and incredibly, harbours a victim mentality to its current status.” 
Senator Johnston felt that AWB had “not learnt any lessons from the Cole commission” (Johnston, 2006). 
Perhaps the most telling indictment on the failed initial strategy was that the AWB International restructure 
arrangements and the demerger proposal barely rated a mention during parliamentary debate. After the negative 
response by key stakeholders, the damaging evidence of the Inquiry and the release of the final report by the 
Inquiry, the parliament did not accept the self-reforms put forward by the company and. Instead the government, 
the parliament and stakeholders pursued radical legislative and regulatory reform that would require a radical 
rethink by the company about its strategic response to the scandal. 
 
The Findings Of The Royal Commission 
If AWBs initial attempts to avoid having to undertake genuine reform through the proposed AWB 
International package and the de-merger proposal had been poorly received, then company’s stonewalling strategy 
was completely scuttled by the Royal Commission. The evidence presented to the Inquiry made it clear that the 
tactics of the company had been to try and manage through the crisis without undertaking genuine reform to 
address the problems within the company, and the wheat marketing arrangements, that had led to the ethical and/or 
illegal transgressions by the company. 
Much of the critic came from the evidence contained in the documents numbered under Exhibit 1020 
relating to Exhibit 665 were otherwise known as “Cole Inquiry – Draft Statement of Contrition”. This was a result 
firstly of the contents of those documents, the additional insights gained from the cross-examination of witnesses 
and then the attempts by the company to have the documents suppressed. The latter situation occurred because the 
documents in question were delivered to the Inquiry by mistake. 
On the issue of documents mistakenly tendered to the Inquiry, Justice Young ruled in AWB Limited v Cole 
(No. 1) and (No. 5) (Young, 2006) that the draft statement of contrition did not need to be returned to AWB or 
removed from the Exhibits list of the Inquiry because it was not protected by a claim for privilege, in part because 
“The documents were prima facie, brought into existence in furtherance of improper and dishonest purpose” 
(Young, 2006). So not only did he rule that the documents be made public but he believed that they were further 
evidence of the transgressions by the company. 
Under questioning from the Commissioner and Counsel Assisting the Commission, the former AWB senior 
in-house counsel acknowledged that AWB had stated in documents associated with those project teams that the 
company “Can’t cooperate fully – too damaging” and that it would play “hardball” with “limited cooperation” 
(Cole, 2006, transcript pp7305, AWB.9004.0053). It was little wonder then that Commissioner Cole felt that he had 
been misled and that the company had not been genuine when it had stated earlier in a public statement that the 
company would cooperate fully (AWB, 2005). 
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Commissioner Cole stated that “The question that concerning me is whether in fact the Inquiry is receiving 
that absolute cooperation” and even directly that “it seems to me we are receiving a façade of cooperation” (Cole, 
2006). In addition to the comments about the conduct of the company during the Inquiry, there was mounting 
evidence about the actions and behaviours of the company that had resulted in the alleged ethical and/or illegal 
activities. Counsel Assisting the Commission accused one former employee of “dissembling” during his testimony 
and asked; “Are you making things up as you go along in order to get yourself out of a hole?”; and, “I suggest to 
you that when you made that statement, and during the course of your evidence yesterday, you were being 
deliberately obstructive” (Cole, 2006). 
What was so damaging about the documents and testimony associated with Exhibit 665, the “Cole Inquiry 
– Draft Statement of Contrition”, was that it laid bare the careful strategy of confecting a so-called public apology, 
that was never even finally delivered to the Cole Inquiry by the then CEO or Chairman. According to one 
Australian newspaper, this batch of material is “essential reading for anyone involved in public life” as it contains a 
“scalding appraisal of AWB’s efforts to weasel out of acknowledging its ethical failures” (Wood, 2006). 
This was hardly the positive environment required by the company to repair its damaged reputation and 
seek the forgiveness that would allow it to return to business. It was unlikely that with such information becoming 
known to the community and key stakeholders, that the AWB International package and the de-merger proposal 
would be positively received and perceived as genuine reforms. Under these circumstances it would be virtually 
impossible for anyone to disconnect the current public statements of the company from the confidential internal 
information that was being revealed during the Inquiry. 
The Mismanagement Of The Initial AWB Response 
According to the established literature (Alsop, 2004; Benoit, 1995; Sims, 2009; van Riel, and Fombrun, 
2007; Poppo and Schepker, 20120; Pfarrer, 2008; Ree and Kim, 2010; Ree and Valdez, 2008; Ree and Hadwick, 
2011; De Maria, 2010; Seeger, 2003; Mahon, 2002: Dukerich, 2002; Gaines-Ross, 2008; Roux-Dufort, 2000; 
Coombs, 1999; Coombs, 2007) for a disgraced organisation to successfully rebuild a tarnished reputation, it must 
first demonstrate a level of contrition sufficient that salient stakeholders and key audiences believe that the 
organisation has learnt the lessons expected of it and is ready to most into the post-crisis phases of re-establishing 
the standing of the company so  that it can continue to operate commercially. Unfortunately, in most situations, 
organisations respond to a crisis by taking a defensive stance (Roux-Dufort, 2000) and in this respect AWB was no 
different to most. 
According to Watson, not only did AWB initially attempt to deny any wrongdoing, the Royal Commission 
discovered a deliberate campaign of deceit to disguise the transgression and attempts to cover it up (Watson, 2007). 
Based on these findings and other revelations about the original transgression and the subsequent transgressions 
around the initial response, De Maria’s description of the rogue organisation failing to adequately confront the 
realities of the scandal it has caused is easily applied to AWB; 
“Rogue PSOs [post-scandal organisations] regret their scandals only because they have raised their illegal 
or immoral profile with the policing and regulatory structures and attracted the unwanted attention of the 
media. The only likely lesson to emerge from their scandals is how not to get caught next time” (De Maria, 
2010, pp72). 
This defensive apologia response represents the narrow single-loop redressive actions such as the denials, 
discrediting and general level of obfuscation displayed by AWB in the initial response to the emerging crisis and 
eventual breaking of the ‘oil-for-food scandal (Sims, 2009). The shift from AWB to double-loop and the eventual 
triple-loop learnings of the legislators and regulators led to the eventual rehabilitation of AWB to the extent that it 
was able to operate successful, albeit with a diminished market share, in an open and competitive but nit fully 
deregulated wheat export marketing arrangements. 
In their work on repairing trust in public organisations, Poppo and Schenker (2010) found that reticence to 
confront the problem was worse than either apologizing or denying to the extent that doing something was better 
than doing nothing. AWB was not only scandalized but discredited by a long list of negative perceptions based on 
it based behaviours and connection to the single desk monopoly. In their work on the repairing of trust in public 
organisations, Poppo and Schepker (2010) identify the failure to respond appropriately to a scandal can further 
harm an organisation’s reputation and legitimacy in the marketplace. 
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There have been a number of frameworks and categorizations for building, maintaining and protecting 
reputations. For example, Benoit (1995) proposes five strategies for firms or individuals as preventative and 
restorative approaches. These are denial, evasion of responsibility, reduction of the offensiveness of the act, 
corrective action, and mortification make up the rhetoric or image repair discourse. Coombs (1999, 2007) develops 
situational crisis communication theory, creating ten categories of basic organisational crisis communication 
strategies. Pfarrer et al (2008) identify the four response stages of discovery, explanation, penance, and 
rehabilitation. These show that organisations that don’t own up to their mistakes can’t achieve genuine reforms to 
address the problems and not just the symptoms of the transgression. In contrast those that are genuine about 
changing their ways embrace double-loop reflective learning and undertake meaningful organisational change.  
This paper also draws on the categorization proposed by De Maria of how organisations respond to the 
crisis of scandal, as this was applied by that author to the initial response by AWB to the ‘oil-for-food’ scandal, so 
it aligns with the use of that company as a case study for evaluating how tarnished organisations rebuild their 
reputations.  Whatever the framework or categorization applied to an organisation seeking, if they are not genuine 
change and reform responses then they will run the risk of being seen as disingenuous, with the perception that 
“talk is cheap” Bottom et al (2002). This highlights the need for stakeholders to have an ability to accept that the 
organisation has understood the severity of the situation as much is it as about punishment. The concept of penance 
entails an acceptance and promise of improvement. Only once stakeholders have this comfort can a damaged 
organisation hope to achieve the forgiveness required for quelling the outrage and anger of a scandal that then 
allows the company to regain the lost legitimacy required for reintegration and rehabilitation.  
In looking at rehabilitation Pfarrer et al (2008) refer to research from organisational renewal, crisis 
management, and public relations and the need for alignment between internal and external actions but of critical 
importance to building, and therefore rebuilding a reputation, is the critical parts played by change management 
and corporate governance. Effective change management and meaningful reforms in corporate governance ensure 
that the causes of the scandal are addressed by the organisation and that stakeholders can have assurance that they 
won’t associated with a repeat or relapse of the unethical or illegal behaviors that led to the transgression that 
caused the scandal. After a scandal, stakeholders are cautious of claims by damaged organisations that they have 
rehabilitated themselves, and this can only occur when these changes have been accepted and validated by salient 
stakeholders. 
Watson concludes after looking at a number of case studies that includes AWB that once the exterior 
wrapping was taken off the companies were seen to have weak ethical performances in their operations and 
relations with key stakeholders such as governments. Mismanagement of a scandal and disingenuous or ineffective 
response can compound the problem but the redressive action such as the initial AWBI proposal of AWB can make 
the breach worse rather than better (Sims, 2009). 
Conclusion 
AWB faced enormous reputational damage as a result of the Oil-For-Food scandal. The initial investigation 
by UN investigator Paul Volker, found that the company, was the biggest single source of kickbacks totalling $220 
million. These payments were not paid by the company but were drawn from the UN escrow account.  The 
Australian Government’s Royal Commission found that the company had lied about its transgressions and as a 
result recommended criminal proceedings against a number of former employees and while the criminal charges 
were dropped by the Australian Federal Police, civil cases were pursued by the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission.  
Rather than face up to these transgressions and seek to remedy them, AWB tried to deny them and then 
avoid having to undertake any genuine reforms to either the company or the regulatory arrangements for 
Australia’s bulk what export trade known as the ‘single desk’. In doing so, the company was punished further for 
being seen as having failed to show contrition or genuine effort to change. The extent to which the company had 
firstly sought to cover-up the transgressions and then avoid the growing demands for action by company, were 
revealed during the Royal Commission.   
 
AWB was inadvertently caught out when a number of documents were accidently provided to the Inquiry 
that highlighted the disingenuous and deceitful manner in which the company was responding. What made matters 
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worse was that rather than then owning up to the original wrongdoing and the evidence contained in the documents, 
the company sought to have them suppressed. This strategy was condemned by the judge ruling on the motion and 
Commissioner Cole. The company was seen to be perpetuating the very culture and behaviors that had caused the 
problems and that were now seen by key stakeholders, especially the government and the parliament, as 
unacceptable and unsustainable.  
These damaging revelations came to light as the company was being seen to trying and avoid genuine 
reform through the minimalist proposals associated with a restructure of the wholly owned AWB Limited 
subsidiary AWB International and then the demerger proposal for AWB Limited and AWB International. Neither 
of these options was well received, especially against the background of the damaging revelations of the Inquiry 
and also before the Inquiry had concluded and the findings released and the recommendations actioned. At best this 
was seen as premature and precipitous but it was far more damaging that they were seen as a deliberate ploy to try 
and avoid accountability and the need for genuine change. The company was seen to be more interested in 
maintaining the monopoly under the ‘single desk’ wheat marketing arrangements.   
The parliamentary debates and legislative process make it clear that AWB’s initial response was 
unsuccessful in stemming the tide of criticism and avoiding significant reform of the operating environment. If the 
initial restructuring proposals were the attempt by the company to self-manage the reform program, then that was 
largely taken out of the company’s hands by the removal of the single desk bulk veto. This then necessitated the 
internal reforms by putting an end to the previously minimalist approach to change and reform. The public 
comments and actions of key stakeholders make it clear that these efforts were simply not believed and not 
accepted as genuine or sufficient. 
Ultimately the company went on to put forward genuine constitutional change, once the initial proposals 
were unsuccessful in mitigating changes to the wheat marketing arrangements. The reforms eventually undertaken 
by the company resulted in the removal of dual-class share ownership structure, where wheat growers had been 
entitled to non-tradable ‘A class’ shares that gave them control of the company board. In contrast to the failure of 
the initial strategy, as a result of the constitutional changes, the company was accredited by the new wheat 
exporting regulator established by Australian Government. Following on from these successful changes and 
reforms, AWB was able to deal with the damage of the sandal and the outrage of the community, including the 
anger of key stakeholders.  
This is not to say that the company could have prevented the loss of the single desk but if it had begun the 
genuine reform process from the beginning it would have avoided unnecessary additional reputation damage and 
potentially hastened the recovery and reintegration process. What is unknown at this point is given the 
circumstances that lead to the scandal, could the company have undertaken the necessary reforms until the initial 
minimalist approach had run its course. It is not for this paper to address this issue or to try and answer those 
questions as the purpose of examining the failure of the initial strategy was to demonstrate that it was unsuitable 
and therefore unsuccessful.  
The success of the eventual strategy of the company in not only apologizing but being seen to take 
appropriate action to change its ways facilitate its reintegration with stakeholders. The company was also believed 
by key audiences that it was genuine and committed to ensuring that similar transgression would not occur again. 
This successful strategy is not the focus of this paper, and while it provides opportunity for further research it does 
provide a useful contrast to the unsuccessful initial post-crisis communication and reputation management strategy 
of the company. 
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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we investigate the similarities and possible convergence between public relations and cultural 
diplomacy in the work of the Indonesian Consulate General in Perth, Western Australia. Using a qualitative 
research approach, interviews were held with Consulate staff and heads of Indonesian organisations based in 
Western Australia.  The findings show that the Consulate General does perform a public relations role through its 
culturally based communication practices. Indonesian community organisations liaise with the Consulate General 
and its publics, and effectively serve as a communication channel to the Indonesian citizens in Perth. Balai Bahasa 
Indonesia Perth, is an example of an international actor performing cultural diplomacy on behalf of Indonesia. The 
research concludes that cultural diplomacy is another form of public relations, in which two-way symmetrical 
communication and mutual understanding are pursued. 
Keywords: cultural diplomacy, consular diplomacy, intercultural communication 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The proximity of Indonesia and Australia, and their history of cooperation and communication, has led to a 
reciprocal interest between the countries’ citizens. This interest spans various fields such as employment, tourism 
and education.  According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2012), there were more than 15,000 
Indonesian students enrolled in Australian institutions in 2012. In addition to these recent migrants are Indonesian 
citizens who were born, live, and work in Australia, while keeping their Indonesian citizenship.  
An embassy is the representative of a government outside the country and has responsibility for the 
wellbeing of its country’s citizens. Toward other countries, an embassy has a role in public relations for its country, 
in which it seeks to establish and maintain a relationship between its nation and the foreign counterpart. The role of 
public relations carried out by the embassy can be seen as public diplomacy, where its purpose is to communicate 
the country’s policies and to maintain a positive image of the country in the view of the foreign public. 
The Indonesian Embassy in Australia is situated in the national capital, Canberra.  However, because Perth 
is geographically remote from the other states and there are numerous Indonesian citizens living and/or studying in 
Western Australia, the Indonesian government established a Consulate in Perth in 1993, becoming a Consulate 
General in 2010.  As an organisation, its main purpose is to provide citizen services, including assisting Indonesian 
citizens with their visa requirements. Indonesian citizens living in Australia have formed a range of student, 
religious-based and ethnic-based organisations, to accommodate the needs of Indonesians for social and shared 
experiences. As an alternative conduit for Indonesian citizens, some of these organisations may need to 
communicate with Indonesian representatives across Australia, depending on the scope of their activities. Likewise, 
the embassy and consulate could consider these organisations as representatives of residents in Western Australia 
and channels of communication to their wider public, the Indonesian citizens. 
Thus, government representatives overseas carry the task of connecting government (and people) on both 
sides. The government-to-government relations known as diplomacy, has been performed since the ancient era and 
is now known as traditional diplomacy   (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992). However, a new era of diplomacy appeared 
with public diplomacy, in which the main agents are not just governments. Public diplomacy takes different forms, 
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as Cull (2008) proposed in his taxonomy. Differing across countries, one of the key aspects of public diplomacy is 
cultural diplomacy. This signifies the act of encouraging culture as a way to introduce and promote a nation to a 
foreign public. Key objectives in conducting cultural diplomacy are to gain the host nation’s interest and to enhance 
the image and reputation of one’s country. Public diplomacy has been traditionally studied in the international 
relations field.  Researchers such as Signitzer and Coombs (1992) have attempted to see public diplomacy and 
public relations within one perspective or to combine both into a new field of study.  However, there has been 
criticism about the effort to unify or to find similarities between these two areas (eg. L'Etang, 2008).  
Differences in public relations practice between Asian nations and the USA, and the need to consider the 
variance in cultural values across cultures as part of a global view of public relations, have been noted (Sriramesh, 
2003; 2009).  The particular importance of interpersonal relationships in Asian cultural contexts and the use of 
personal influence models have been addressed in recent research (Devereux and Peirson-Smith, 2009; Kent and 
Taylor, 2011). Multiculturalism, ethnocentrism and different worldviews may colour the process of building mutual 
relationships between nations. In exploring this territory we asked two research questions: How does the 
Indonesian Consulate General in Perth conduct public relations in the form of cultural diplomacy? Can students’ 
and workers’ organisations’ participate in these processes as third parties?  
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Using a qualitative research methodology situated within an interpretive paradigm, this study aimed “to 
understand how people in everyday natural settings create meaning and interpret the events of their world” 
(Wimmer and Dominick, 2006, p. 113).  Semi-structured interviews with key staff of the Indonesian Consulate 
General and members of Indonesian organisations were conducted in Perth in 2011. Information gleaned from 
interviews was supplemented with documentary research and periods of participant observation by one author 
(Vidyarini) as an intern at the Consulate and at Balai Bahasa Indonesia Perth, an autonomous Indonesian language 
and cultural organisation. 
Consulate staff interviewed included the Consul General and vice consuls from the Cultural and 
Information Division, the Consular Division, and the Economic Affairs Division. The head of Balai Bahasa 
Indonesia Perth (BPIP) was also interviewed. 
The heads of three Indonesian organisations were interviewed as part of the research: PPIA WA 
(Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia di Australia-Indonesian Students’ Association of Western Australia), AIPSSA 
(Australian  Indonesian Postgraduate Students’ and Scholars’ Association) and KIPAS (Karyawan Indonesia di 
Perth Australia-Indonesian Workers in Perth Australia).  
Recorded interviews were transcribed and then analysed using the “constant comparative technique”, first 
articulated by Glasser and Strauss in 1967 (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006, p. 113). The qualitative analysis 
software NVivo8 was used to facilitate this process. Most of the interviews were conducted in the Indonesian 
language.  Respondents answered in a mixture of Indonesian languages-in which various slang and dialects were 
used, as well as Javanese and English. The interpretation was done in Indonesian, and then translated to English. 
 
 
Findings 
 
Culture and Diplomacy 
 
 
Generally, we found that the understanding of the term diplomacy by the Consulate General staff is about 
understanding the needs of the people whom the diplomats represent and how to provide for those needs. The 
Consul General himself believed that public diplomacy was a part of diplomacy as a whole and allowed the 
harnessing of the whole community. One of the goals of the overseas mission is to create a positive image which 
involves using all assets of the country, in this sense including Indonesian citizens who are living in the area of 
accreditation. The Consul General stated that: “We have to introduce Indonesia. That is why what I have in mind is 
how to showcase Indonesia's performances…with a polite and friendly attitude, in terms of fighting for the interest 
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of Indonesian Republic.” Although Indonesia is relatively close to Australia and the relationship between the two 
countries has been established over a long period of time, the Consulate General referred to improving the 
knowledge Australians have of Indonesia and of the need for Indonesia to constantly inform Australia of its true 
identity and what it has to offer. 
The diplomats interviewed during this research are central to the creation of an image. Image is sculpted by 
various tools, one of which is culture, and it is the concept of cultural diplomacy which underlines its the use of 
culture as a tool or means to promote one’s country. The term culture is often interpreted as something that is 
related to performing arts, indigenous ornaments and traditional artefacts.  In this sense culture is something visible 
that defines one’s own identity as a member of a large group of people (Samovar, Porter and McDaniel, 2008). This 
understanding was expressed by multiple Consulate General staff, particularly in relation to the use of cultural 
performances as a means for conveying a message; that is, the cultural heritage possessed by Indonesia as a nation.  
Cultural activities conducted by the Consulate General ranged from independent cultural exhibitions and 
performances; tourism promotion, such as the Bali promotion road-show; and joint expos with other countries, such 
as the Perth Holiday and Travel Expo (Cultural and Information Division, 2010). These core events are being held 
annually. Promotional activities were associated with stage performances, exhibitions and art related events, 
including dancing and playing traditional musical instruments.  They are seen as key promotional means, and 
important to giving a tangible identity to Indonesian culture.  
 
 
Building Relationships with Mutual Understanding 
 
 
One of the main duties of the Consulate General focuses on the relationship and cooperation with the 
Western Australian government. The purpose of the relationship is related to the protection of Indonesian citizens 
in WA. The Vice consul of the Consular Division explained that: 
With the state government, for example with the premier, it's more of bilateral cooperation between 
Indonesia and WA. We become the link. For example, the East Java government has a sister city 
cooperation, we convey (the message) that we have this intention to cooperate. Or when we have a function 
we also invite the state government. That is more of cooperation...but, if it's the level of Australia (the 
coordination and leadership) is in Canberra.  
The Consulate General acted as a link or channel of intention from provincial governments in Indonesia to 
WA, whereas the scope of the Indonesian embassy in Canberra covered Australia. The Consulate General 
cooperates with Western Australian government agencies such as the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. 
The Economic Affairs Division has a strong relationship with the AIBC (Australia Indonesia Business Council). 
The Cultural and Information Division handles applications from the Western Australian media who wish to report 
in Indonesia, which is then sent to Jakarta. On a weekly and monthly basis, the Cultural and Information Division 
performs media monitoring particularly in the areas of culture and humanities. This media monitoring report, 
combined with reports by the Consular Division and the Economic Affairs Division, is sent to Jakarta. The Cultural 
and Information Division in partnership with the Western Australia Department of Education and Training offers 
the Language Assistant Program to provide teacher assistants for Indonesian Language teachers in WA.  It also 
connects Western Australian schools and universities with researchers, schools and universities in Indonesia.  
Other than inter-governmental cooperation, or so-called government to government cooperation, the 
Consul General also carries out informal liaison with the Western Australia government. This approach is 
employed as a reinforcement of a previous formal relationship and is carried out by individual contact. The one on 
one approach denotes the significance of knowing the counterpart individually outside the institution to which they 
belong.  In the process of establishing a relationship with the other party, one must have significant knowledge 
about that other party. This includes knowledge of the culture, the demeanour of the other party, way of life, 
language, and other cultural aspects. 
The Consul General underlined the use of the cultural approach in conducting diplomacy, when he said, 
“diplomacy is an art, a method. It is the means. It can be cultural, educational, economic.” He further added, “We 
also need to see the formal rule, but the means is through culture.” Culture is seen as a broad term, more than the 
iconic and daily life perspectives. By saying that diplomacy is a tool or a means, and by indicating that culture is 
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used as a tool, diplomacy may be understood as more than just the process of formal negotiation. Diplomacy is an 
action that involves many aspects, from formal through institutionalised meetings, through to informal via other 
aspects, such as cultural experiences.  
 
 
Partnership with Indonesian Organisations 
 
 
Indonesian organisations were formed to accommodate the needs of Indonesian citizens of various 
backgrounds, such as students, certain ethnic groups and religious affiliations. The three organisations considered 
in this research were selected from the many that assist the Consulate General, directly and indirectly through the 
provision of labour, ideas, independent action and inter-organisational partnerships. Most of these organisations 
were created without formal recognition from the Consulate General.  Membership is voluntary and members often 
belong to more than one organisation. 
AIPSSA has around 300 members, consisting of postgraduate students, scholars and their family members. 
AIPSSA contributes to the Consulate General activities through their large membership and close connection with 
academics in educational institutions. PPIA WA is a smaller branch of PPIA based in Canberra and covers 
Indonesian students from all levels of education, without having an official registration system for membership. 
However, in order to get all the benefits from the organisations, students are still required to register.  Despite its 
function to accommodate the needs of Indonesian students in Western Australia, PPIA WA also promotes 
Indonesia through entertainment, social relations and cultural events.  
While AIPSSA and PPIA help in promotion in the fields of education and entertainment. KIPAS works 
closely with Indonesian workers in Western Australia. It supports the Consulate General in the promotional effort 
by providing labour, ideas, performers, and information about the work situation in Western Australia. For 
example, a recent Employment Workshop organised by KIPAS gathered ideas that arose from Indonesian workers’ 
real experiences and the results of observation of their everyday encounters with Western Australians. Resulting 
information on opportunities and competencies required by Western Australian companies was conveyed to the 
Consulate General. 
From their membership databases, these organisations provide information required by the Consulate 
General to track Indonesian citizens living in Western Australia. Indonesian citizens travelling overseas are advised 
to inform the government representative in the country of visit about their arrival, by doing a self-report. This 
action is compulsory according to the Indonesian Law of Population number 23/2006 (The Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 2006) and allows the Embassy, Consulate General or Consulate to identify the citizens and 
give service and protection in case of need. However, the law has not been properly socialised resulting in many 
Indonesians overseas being unaware of their obligation and remain unregistered. The gap in information can 
potentially be filled by the Indonesian organisations. For example, KIPAS assisted the Consulate General during 
the last Indonesian Presidential election. PPIA WA has a one day a week meeting with students, especially during 
new students’ orientation, where it introduces itself and directs the students toward the Consulate General. This 
program allows the Consulate General to reach newly arrived students benefitting both the organisations and the 
Consulate General. The student organisations have an important role as a channel of communication to Indonesian 
students about laws and regulations. 
The Consulate General cooperates with the heads of Indonesian organisations to liaise with Indonesian 
communities. The contacts are established through the use of new communication technologies such a smart 
phones utilizing social networking. The head of AIPSSA reported that the Consulate General seldom sent formal 
letters to the leaders of organisations calling them to meetings, “But all kinds of consulate activities are announced 
by gethok tular.” The expression, gethok tular, in Javanese can be translated as mouth to mouth or word of mouth. 
The use of communication technology such as smart phones or email assumed a close two-way connection between 
both parties unconstrained by formal bureaucracy.  
The partnership between the Consulate General and the organisations runs both ways. The organisations 
have ideas and plans about events which they convey to the Consulate General. The communication process puts 
emphasis on the importance of word of mouth and public information mediums, such as posters. The organisations 
conduct informal communication with their members and the Consulate General provides formal invitations to 
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some members. Through mutual cooperation, the Consulate General obtains valuable labour and assistance for their 
events while the organisations accept significant support, other than money, and some status because their activities 
are noticed by an Indonesian authority. 
Balai Bahasa Indonesia Perth (BBIP) 
 
 
Balai Bahasa Indonesia Perth Inc. (BBIP) was established in 2008 by an Australian language teacher with 
the support of the Indonesian Consulate in Perth. The initial plan was to create a cultural centre for Indonesians and 
Australians who were interested in learning about Indonesian culture. The organisation is autonomous and run by a 
board which includes representatives from the community, the Indonesian Consulate in Perth and the Westralian 
Indonesian Language Teachers Association (WILTA). Describing itself as “a cultural, non-profit organisation” 
(Balai Bahasa Indonesia Perth Inc, 2011a), BBIP aims to provide Indonesian language and culture education to 
assist Australians and Indonesians to interact more effectively. A key role involves providing access to 
conversational Indonesian language classes at a range of levels for both adults and school children (Balai Bahasa 
Indonesia Perth Inc, 2011c).  The stakeholders for BBIP are a combination of Indonesian and Australian citizens, 
but particularly Australians who may not have accessed Indonesian language in schools and who can learn more 
about Indonesia. 
 
BBIP regularly organises events introducing Indonesian culture. Examples include the July 2009 
Indonesian Language Expo, 2010 events held to introduce the participants (mostly Australians) to the cooking of 
Indonesian cuisine and Indonesian Business Insight seminars (Balai Bahasa Indonesia Perth Inc, 2011b). BBIP 
cooperates with the Australia Indonesia Business Council (AIBC), attending their events to represent the aims of 
the organisation. Besides organising events for itself, BBIP also supports other cultural activities synchronised with 
their objective of fostering positive attitudes between both countries.  
Although the major means of media communication is through its website, BBIP has a close relationship 
with the Western Australian Journalists Association (WAJA). A current board member is a freelance journalist for 
a government agency. In 2010, BBIP developed a media award, to be presented at the WAJA awards, for a 
journalist who reports positive news about Indonesia and/or the Indonesian-Australian relationship.  
BBIP is a non-profit organisation whose main objective is to build relationships between the two countries 
through education in the language sector and through pursuing a positive attitude among its participants. BBIP 
therefore has a public relations role. The current chairperson of BBIP stated:  
We want to promote the everyday Indonesia. We want to promote contemporary Indonesians and that 
means, I guess, showing people how Indonesians live their daily lives but integrating the traditional into the 
modern. So we want people in Australia to know what traditional Indonesia’s like but how an Indonesian 
takes that tradition and uses it day to day....Language is central to what we’re doing because, you know, we 
believe in order to understand that culture you really have to start understanding it through the language. 
For BBIP language is being introduced as a separate entity from culture. However, it is essential for 
someone to learn a language to be really exposed to and understand a culture. It is important to recognize the 
counterpart’s mindset, values, way of life, belief, and try to acknowledge the differences. The process of creating 
mutual understanding between both parties includes one’s knowledge about the other. As the chairperson of BBIP 
explained: 
It’s not just about us teaching Australians about Indonesians, but about letting Indonesians know that in 
Australia, the concept of space is different, or the concept of time or, yeah, modesty - all those sorts of 
things. 
As an organisation run primarily by Australians, BBIP serves the purpose of introducing Indonesian culture 
and providing a gateway for a closer relationship between both countries. It has the benefit of its Australian 
members who understand Australian culture.  However, the Consulate General also has an interest despite BBIP 
being an autonomous and non-governmental entity. 
 
 
Discussion 
Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal, Vol 13(2), 2012 
 
32 
 
 
 
The Consulate General performs vital tasks in providing citizen services and promoting a positive image of 
Indonesia. An essential element in the process is communication. The public for the Consulate General are both 
Indonesians and Western Australians. Both publics are reached with different tools of communication and receive 
different intended messages. The use of traditional and modern communication technologies implies that the 
Consulate General enacts the role of communication technician (Broom, 2009). The Consulate General plans, 
creates and produces its packaged message. Two-way communication occurs in relation to Consular matters and 
immigration rules. Furthermore, this means other public relations models such as public information and two-way 
asymmetrical communication, or even the combination of the four models are still relevant for the Consulate 
General (Grunig and Hunt, 1984). The challenge facing the Consulate General in establishing two-way symmetrical 
communication, that cultivates mutual understanding, may lie in the nature of the Consulate General as a 
government agency. The autonomy of Balai Bahasa Indonesia Perth (BBIP) as a nongovernmental organisation 
may preserve the independence of that organisation. Publics will tend to ignore cultural agents that are seen as 
close partners with a government agency (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010).  Although BBIP has positive intent 
toward both countries, its independence from tangible government involvement may explain the success of its 
approach to Western Australians. 
To promote Indonesia, the Consulate General uses various formal and informal means. The formal means 
are consistent with what Signitzer and Coombs (1992) have called traditional diplomacy; government to 
government. However, the findings show the Consulate General also employed informal strategies, including 
personal approaches and cultural promotions. The Consul General emphasised an informal one on one approach, 
accessing a larger range of people than only Western Australian government officials. These personal meetings 
were seen as strengthening the formal approach already conducted with various government agencies by the Consul 
General and his staff. It can be said that the Indonesian government wants Indonesia to be known as a nation that is 
polite and friendly; an attitude which becomes a part of the national identity (Samovar, Porter and McDaniel, 
2008). The more subtle approaches of the personal and the informal indicate that contemporary public diplomacy is 
not about propaganda per se (Gilboa, 2008). Diplomacy is an intricate process in which an initial interpersonal 
relationship that accentuates the interest in developing a mutual understanding, is the precursor to a lasting nation 
to nation relationship.   
The image building activities described are consistent with Curtin and Gaither’s (2007) view that the main 
publics targeted for image cultivation are governments (WA government) and other international actors, such as 
NGOs (non-government organisations). In this case, the Australia Indonesia Business Council (AIBC) and BBIP 
are the international actors with BBIP fulfilling the cultural diplomatic role of a nongovernmental agency (Wang, 
2006). It is interesting that BBIP is a WA based organisation with the majority of committee members being 
Australian. BBIP is not just Western Australians receiving the outcomes of promotion by the Indonesian 
government, it actively promotes Indonesian culture. 
The Consulate General’s activities reflect the dimensions of public diplomacy put forward by Nye (2008) 
and cover not only daily interaction with the foreign public but also the effort of the agency to build long term 
relationships. The activities show the soft power of diplomacy through interpersonal relationships, with public 
relations at the centre. Our findings also show that Western Australians and Indonesians are different types of 
public. Indonesian citizens could be defined as an active public (Signitzer and Wamser, 2006) who may influence 
how the Consulate General performs its duties. Western Australians connect with the Consulate General for limited 
purposes, such as visa requirements, business, or as guests at certain cultural events and may thus be seen as aware 
publics (Signitzer and Wamser, 2006).  
In relation to the Consulate General’s cultural programs, structured research into public opinion would be 
useful to define the Western Australian public it will face. Through research, the Consulate General is listening to 
the public (Cull, 2008). It scans the environment and collects information about their primary public, which is an 
initial step in public diplomacy (Cull, 2008). Toward the Indonesian government, the Consulate General enacts the 
role of a boundary spanner when it is relaying information about the environment to the organisation in which the 
process is conducted in a symmetrical fashion (Fawkes, 2007). The media monitoring conducted by the Consulate 
General could be expanded into deeper research on the nature of Western Australians resulting in more effective 
cultural communication. With respect to what L’Etang (2008, p. 212) has referred to as “a government-sponsored 
official notion of national culture”, a richer mutual understanding may require more than displays of arts, 
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performance and delicious cuisine. Still, it is clear that messages about culture, packaged in the form of the arts 
(dances, music, cuisine, costume etc), do allow Western Australians to identify with the iconic culture of Indonesia. 
This iconic culture represents the identity of Indonesia as a nation, whose members are Indonesian (Samovar, 
Porter and McDaniel, 2008). However, to truly understand Indonesia, Western Australians would need to take into 
account the varied ethnic identities, languages and cultural practices that make up the diverse nation of Indonesia. 
So while iconic cultural activities are considered to be supportive elements of the formal relationship between both 
governments, their influence and effectiveness in cultivating deeper mutual understanding, and for promoting a 
certain image, are perhaps limited but have the potential to be extended.   
Ananto (2004, p. 278) has commented on the collective nature of Indonesian culture and the concept of 
“gotong royong (spirit of mutual responsibility for a task where each person belongs to a team)”. In cooperating 
with the Indonesian organisations to reach Indonesians in Western Australia, the Consulate General displays the 
nature of a collectivistic society utilising available members (Hofstede, 1984; Kent and Taylor, 2011). In order to 
reach dispersed communities, other than through community visits, the Consulate General communicates with key 
persons of Indonesian communities or organisations. The key person or people in the group act as an important 
gatekeeper and a channel of communication with the Consulate General. With respect to public relations, 
Indonesian organisations play an important part in the communication process. Indonesian organisations can 
initiate and accommodate dialogue, and thus become a link in a collective society type of public relations. The 
Indonesian organisations initiate dialogue through the utilisation of information and communication technologies, 
such as social networking. The organisations themselves facilitate communication between the Consulate General 
and Indonesian communities, thus performing a role described as communication facilitator (Broom, 2009). The 
use of communication technologies such as social networking on mobile devices may become the key to enhanced 
communication and promotion by the Consulate General, and perhaps cultivate real two-way symmetrical 
communication. This method of communication can also be used with Western Australians, a means that may 
support the formal promotion efforts from the central government. In this way aware publics can be made into 
active publics. 
Although two-way symmetrical communication is an ideal seldom realised, there are significant elements 
of cultural exchange occurring in the interactions of the Indonesian Consulate General in Perth. Indonesian 
community organisations play a key role in assisting the Consulate General to communicate with its publics. 
Overall, this project has found that cultural diplomacy is a form of public relations, enacted through culturally 
based promotional activities using a combination of traditional and modern communication practices. 
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Abstract 
 
Activist groups have dual identities: the way they see themselves and the way others see them.  Community 
opposition to coal seam gas and large-scale coal mining in Australia has highlighted this distinction as the radical 
“Lock the Gate Alliance” and others attempt to hold back the accelerating momentum of coal seam gas 
exploitation. 
This paper backgrounds CSG development in Australia and applies activism, social identity and risk scholarship to 
examine this alliance of highly motivated opponents in terms of its self-identified roles and responses to industry 
and governments.  It explores implications for organisations confronted by radical activists who pursue a strategy 
of non-cooperation and questions the effectiveness of such an approach. The paper suggests that non-cooperation 
may limit activists’ capacity to achieve their objectives. 
 
Key words: activism, coal seam gas, social identity, risk 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Community social movement or activism has generated a substantial body of research and literature across 
many different fields of public relations in terms of both promoting and responding to activist causes (Burke, 2005; 
den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Hon 2006, Spar & La Mure, 2003). These include corporate communications, 
political lobbying, stakeholder relations, issue management, framing, community outreach, corporate social 
responsibility, reputation management, investor communications, and crisis management among others. 
 
However, the many aspects of activism can usefully be brought together in a case study, where focus on a 
particular activist campaign can effectively illuminate the actions and motivations of parties to an issue and present 
the strategies used for examination. 
 
Controversy over the extraction of coal seam gas is a classic activist issue, superficially appearing to pit 
small communities against mining giants.   But when this controversy migrated to Australia in the 1990s a more 
sophisticated scenario emerged involving the contest of national, local, financial, political, environmental and 
social forces. 
 
An outspoken opponent of coal seam gas exploration and development in Australia is the Lock the Gate 
Alliance. In this paper, case analysis is used to explore how this radical activist alliance positioned itself within a 
tangle of competing agendas.  We suggest that the group has found itself on the margins of policy development 
because it is isolated by idealism and a strategy of non-cooperation,  
 
 
Background 
 
 
Australia’s wealth has long relied on mineral exploitation, going back to the gold rushes of the 1850s and 
1860s, although minerals have overtaken agricultural products as the country’s most valuable exports. Furthermore, 
energy resources play a dominant role, with coal being Australia’s second largest export earner (second only to iron 
ore) closely followed by gas, petroleum products and uranium. 
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While these energy resources came from offshore gas fields or remote mine sites, Australia’s largely urban 
population paid only limited attention.  But that began to change in the 1990s with the emerging exploitation of 
coal seam gas (CSG).  It is over 95% methane and is extracted from relatively shallow coal deposits, typically at 
between 300 and 1,000 metres. CSG is used for industrial and domestic purposes, as well as in gas turbines to 
generate electricity (CSIRO, 2012) 
 
Most importantly, substantial areas of CSG reserves largely coincide with high-value agricultural land, 
with some areas also lying above Australia’s important underground water resources, particularly in Queensland, 
New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. 
 
With CSG development perceived to be threatening farm land and water resources, and moving closer to 
larger urban areas, the industry has become a lightning rod for public concern about “uncontrolled development”, 
with opposition further fuelled by the claimed environmental risks of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) of coal seams 
to release the gas.   
 
The three populous “eastern states” are where much of the commercial CSG has been identified and where 
it is believed many of the political, social and environmental issues will be played out.   Adding complexity to the 
issue is that while the Commonwealth has some regulatory authority over underground aquifers, state governments 
control mining licences and land use planning.   
 
Queensland has by far the greatest CSG development, with 90% of the state’s gas coming from CSG and 
massive current investment in huge plants to convert CSG to LNG for export.  New South Wales also has large 
CSG reserves, though only very limited current production, but is moving to extend exploration and development 
after the withdrawal of a temporary moratorium. Victoria also has substantial CSG reserves but no active 
development. At the time of writing the state has a moratorium on exploration and development pending 
establishment of national guidelines being developed jointly by the Commonwealth and State governments, based 
on the work of a Federal Independent Expert Scientific Committee established in 2011.
3
 
 
Broadly, however, the Commonwealth and state governments all support appropriate development of CSG 
in the national and local interest, provided adequate safeguards are in place.  This is the environment in which the 
Lock the Gate Alliance finds itself attempting to hold back development. 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
 
The issue of coal seam gas development in Australia, and how it is managed in terms of the communication 
and policy strategies of key stakeholders, can be seen in the context of three broad areas of scholarship – activism, 
social identity and risk. 
 
Activism 
 
Larissa Grunig was an early researcher in the field of activism whose definition of an activist group has 
stood the test of time: 
 
“.. a group of two or more individuals who organise to influence another public or publics through action 
that may include education, compromise, persuasion,, pressure tactics or force (Grunig, L. 1992) 
 
Although her definition was satisfyingly broad, much of the subsequent scholarship has focused on what 
has been called an “organisational-centric” approach to understanding activism, which builds on a characterization 
of bilateral relationships between organisations – primarily big business or big government – and activist groups. 
 
This “corporate vs activist” approach has produced a substantial literature exploring the development of 
organisational “response” to what is presented as an activist “problem”.  This in turn, saw the emergence of a major 
                                                          
3
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sub-section of the literature which aligns activism with anti-corporatism.  Some of this more confrontational 
literature – from the activist and the corporate viewpoint – specifically addresses both the morality and value of co-
operation and warns of the perceived dangers of such co-operation (Beder, 2006; Nicols, 2001). 
 
At the same time two other important areas developed – firstly, attempting to understand and characterise 
the nature and motivation of activists (Fassin, 2009; Henderson, 2005; Jaques, 2006) and secondly, attempting to 
define a modus vivendi  between activists and their targets (Burke, 2005; Galloway, 2005; Taylor, Vasquez & 
Doorley, 2003) 
 
Updating the original Grunig definition, den Hond and de Bakker (2007) wrote: 
 
Activist groups emerge out of the need for organisation and co-ordination.  They are activist in 
transforming shared ideals, concerns and grievances into organized contention, and they are a group in the 
sense that a collective identify enables them to overcome the problem of collective action (p. 903) 
 
When characterising such groups it is a common practice to place them along a spectrum – from those 
which are willing to co-operate with corporates and authorities, to radical groups which reject any co-operation 
with the establishment 
. 
In the context of corporate social change, reformative groups can be defined as those which believe that 
although companies are part of the problem they can also be part of the solution. By contrast, radical groups do not 
believe that companies can part of the solution (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). 
 
This distinction has led to a great deal of theorizing on how both corporates and activists should develop 
mutual relationships (Cooper, 2009; Hon, 2006; Susskind & Field, 1996).  A very influential early conception was 
“two-way symmetrical communication” which was developed as an ideal model (Grunig, J, 1992; Grunig, Grunig 
and Dozier, 2002)   However, this approach has many critics, who argue that two-way communication is essential, 
but that symmetry may be illusory (Derville, 2005; Stokes & Rubin, 2010) 
 
In fact, some activist groups at the radical end of the spectrum reject the win-win philosophy and regard co-
operation as a sell-out.  As one activist manual proposes: 
 
Be a responsible extremist.  Responsible extremism sets the agenda. To move the media, you must 
communicate as responsible extremists, not as reasonable moderates (Gunther, 1985, para.8). 
 
It is this contest between corporates and confrontation which is explored in the case study here which 
involves the Lock the Gate Alliance. 
 
Social identity and the social construction of risk  
 
What is it that unites the disparate membership of organisations such as the Lock the Gate Alliance 
(LTGA) and their individual adherents other than a desire to preserve and protect things they value? Stallings 
argued that “risk and safety are not objective conditions ‘out there’ simply waiting to be perceived by citizens or 
calculated by professional risk analysts”; rather, he contended, they are embedded in social structure (1990,p. 80). 
Risk, then, is socially constructed, not just scientifically assessed. While LTGA is focused on perceived risks 
associated with coal and coal seam gas extraction, the scope of its attention and activity is wider than hazards 
alone, so risk theories are not in themselves sufficient to explain the movement’s motivation and growth. Theories 
of identity provide one way of considering how such organisations are able to link such a diversity of groups. 
 
The theories suggest that social movement organisations are sustained by people who find in them a raison 
d’etre related not only to the organisation’s identity but also to their own. Further, social identity theory advances 
the notion that while people identify with their own group, they accentuate differences with those who do not 
belong. For example, LTGA’s activism appears to be founded in a preservationist identity, with its protest tactics 
expressing an ethos based on protecting what the group prizes against the perceived depredations of outsiders. In 
the same way, the outsiders, whether governments or mining companies, are positioned as possessing identities 
which at best are conservationist (where that term is understood to mean the wise use of the world’s resources to 
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benefit people) and at worst, predatory, profit-driven and indifferent to communities’ concerns, setting up a “we 
care, they don’t” dichotomy. 
 
Identity is one of the main factors influencing sustained participation in social movements (Klandermans, 
2002 and Whittier, 1995, in Hardnack, 2011, p.65). However, social movement scholars’ studies have extended 
beyond individual identities to encompassing “the broader collective identities of social movements and social 
movement organisations (Hardnack, 2011, p. 64). Hardnack notes that “new social movement theory suggests 
collective identities define personal and social identities” (p.65). Collective identity has been linked to social 
movement participation and activity (Hardnack, 2011, p.66); Melucci (1989) says it is the way a group collectively 
defines itself, taking into account “members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity” (cited in Hardnack, 
2011, p.67).  
 
Henderson studied the role of identity and power in issues management campaigns, illustrating “how issues 
management strategies involving the management of multiple identities can motivate significant public activism” 
(2005, p.117). She cites Heath, who suggested that identity – creating a persona characteristic of the organisation – 
was one of the key elements of any issue management campaign and commented that people are often simply asked 
to trust the symbolic identity of an organisation (1997,p. 124, in Henderson, 2005, p.124). Drawing on Cheney & 
Christensen’s view that organisations “must attempt to manage both identifiable issues and their own identities”, 
Henderson comments that, “an interest group resisting the normalised discourse needs, therefore, to articulate a 
particular identity to facilitate legitimation of this counter-discourse and to gain support” (Cheney & Christensen, 
2001, p. 233, in Henderson, 2005,p. 124).  
 
Henderson uses three ideas in discussing identity, suggesting that it may be viewed as “belonging”; 
“representation” and “a way of organising”. She describes the latter concept as “how individuals create structures 
that build an identity as an organisation or interest group” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; R.Scott, Corman, & 
Cheney, 1998, in Henderson, 2005, p. 125). In this sense, says Henderson, identity management is an important 
strategy in issues management.  
 
Fielding et al argue that “Whether community members engage in environmental activism is …likely to be 
determined by whether they are aligned with a group that encourages and supports this type of behaviour” (2005, 
p.6). They note that: 
 
According to social identity theory, an individual’s self-concept comprises both personal and social 
identities (Abrams 1999; Tajfel 1981; Turner et al., 1994). Personal identities involve unique self-
descriptions, whereas a social identity is the part of an individual’s self-concept that stems from 
membership of a social group (or groups) and comprises knowledge of that membership, as well as the 
value and emotional significance that the membership entails (Tajfel 1981). Identification and 
categorisation of the self in terms of a particular social group or category highlights the similarities shared 
with members of that same group and the differences between the in-group and other out-groups (Turner et 
al, 1994) 
 
On this basis, we argue that LTGA resists normalised discourse needs, as described by Henderson, and that 
in line with her analysis, LTGA’s articulation and reinforcement of its identity may be seen not only as reactive, a 
response to CSG developments, but also as strategic and forward-looking. 
 
 
The Lock the Gate Alliance 
 
 
According to its website (https://lockthegate.org.au, accessed 26 October, 2012)  
 
Lock the Gate Alliance is a national grassroots organisation made up of thousands of individuals and over 
160 local groups who are concerned about inappropriate mining. The mission of the Lock the Gate 
Alliance is to protect Australia’s natural, environmental, cultural and agricultural resources from 
inappropriate mining and to educate and empower all Australians to demand sustainable solutions to food 
and energy production (About Lock the Gate, paras 1 & 2). 
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The Alliance says it has five central aims: to protect Australia’s water systems; agricultural land for food 
and fibre production; bushlands, wetlands and wildlife; the health of all Australians and Australia’s Aboriginal and 
cultural heritage (LTGA website, About Lock the Gate, para.4, accessed 26 October, 2012). 
 
The Lock the Gate Alliance  was formed in 2010 following meetings in New South Wales and Queensland 
of landholders and others concerned about the rapid expansion of coal and coal seam gas development.  LTGA 
president Mr Drew Hutton credits private showings of the controversial 2010 documentary Gasland
 4
 with sparking 
the initial interest. The film deals with communities affected by natural gas drilling in the United States, and for 
many Australians was certainly their first exposure to the issue. 
 
Mr Hutton, an environmental advocate and former Green Party candidate (Macfie, 2012), spent time in 
regional and rural areas canvassing the issues with farmers. He told New Zealand journalist Rebecca Macfie that 
during that period, he learned of mounting tensions between landowners and the companies drilling for gas on and 
around their properties. “[Farmers] were feeling disempowered … They had no way of organising, or any real 
strategy to deal with what they were facing. I said to farmers, ‘You might not like me [as a prominent 
environmentalist]’, and farmers haven’t tended to like environmentalists. But I said to them that they were not 
going to win this west of the Great Dividing Range
5 
 as a farmers’ issue, and I didn’t think it could be won as a 
green issue, either. They needed to be brought together.” (Macfie, 2012, para. 2).  Mr Hutton called a meeting and 
“suggested either [we] roll over or take [things] to a new level”. In an interview with one of the authors he 
identified a town/country aspect: “Farmers saw the advantage of a strategic alliance – [taking] the fight to the city” 
(pers comm, 27 June, 2012). 
 
 
Formation 
 
 
In late 2010 a forum representing over 40 community, professional and environmental groups from across 
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia found that communities across Australia faced 
common issues wherever coal mining and coal seam gas was being expanded. The forum “considered the role of 
government in the expansion of the coal and coal seam gas industries and the lack of consideration for the will of 
local residents and communities in the approval of these coal and gas projects.” (LTGA website, History, para.2, 
accessed 26 October, 2012). 
  
Meanwhile in south-east Queensland, local landholders, farmers and environmentalists gathered to 
consider a response to the state government’s approval of a number of major coal seam gas developments. At this 
meeting “the ‘Lock the Gate’ name was decided, and so began the campaign calling on all landholders to refuse to 
negotiate access to coal seam gas companies and refuse to negotiate sale of their properties to coal companies” 
(LTGA website, History, para.3., accessed 26 October, 2012).  
 
The Lock the Gate campaign was launched in November 2010, while The Lock the Gate Alliance (LTGA) 
was incorporated in NSW in December 2010 and became a registered company in March 2012. Member groups 
(167 at time of writing) range from animal advocates (Australians for Animals NSW) to chambers of commerce 
(Bulahdelah Chamber of Commerce) to churches (Community Church of St Mark, Clifton Hill, Victoria) to 
environmental issues advocates (Friends of the Earth) to water users (NSW Artesian BoreWater Users Association) 
to indigenous groups (the Plains Clan of the Wonnarua People). 
 
 
 
 
Principles 
 
                                                          
4
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5
 The Great Dividing Range separates the east coast of Australia from the inland (http://australia.gov.au/about-
australia/australian-story/austn-rocks-and-mountains 
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The Alliance says it is committed to three core principles: 
 
1. That robust scientific assessment, the precautionary principle, and the principle of intergenerational 
equity should guide decision-making. 
2. That communities should have the ultimate say, within the context of principle 1. 
3. That it will support all and any communities who support the objectives of the Alliance (LTGA website, 
About Lock the Gate, para.3, accessed 26 October, 2012). 
 
[The precautionary principle “asserts, essentially, that ‘when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of [the] 
damage or the likelihood of the risk’ posed by some activity…’then decisions should be made so as to prevent such 
activity…unless and until scientific evidence shows that the damage will not occur” (Sunstein, 2005, in Slovic, 
2010, p. 190)]. 
 
In an interview with one of the authors, Mr Hutton outlined other Alliance values: 
 
 Autonomy and “self-activity”. “A blockade [of a farming property to prevent drilling] is always run by the 
local group. There is never any hint of the central organisation taking over. There is an ethic of we’re here 
to help, not take over.” 
 Guarding the land: “It’s almost nationalistic – about protecting [our] country” 
 Community cohesiveness on the CSG issue (and also on coal mining issues – the Alliance is against both). 
This means looking to what the Alliance sees as the community interest rather than individuals’ interests: 
“We are not just leaving it to the landowner as, if one lets them [the coal seam gas miners] on [to their 
land], it divides the community.” 
 “Respect for rural people – farmers” (pers comm 27 June, 2012). 
 
An earlier version of the LTGA website, accessed on 22 June, 2012, included material on the Alliance’s 
views about governments’ role, stating that the grouping was concerned about  
 
the devastating impact that certain inadequately addressed and inadequately-regulated fossil fuel extraction 
industries are having on our short and long term physical, social, environmental and economic wellbeing.  
 
Under the heading of What does LOCK THE GATE want? The Alliance was unequivocal about its view on 
governments’ role: 
 
neither we, nor our governments (at all levels) are sufficiently well informed about these industries, about 
their true role in our economy and their impact on our health and welfare as a nation…We are concerned 
that the short-term greed associated with these industries (including that of governments through royalties 
and other returns) is compromising the welfare of future generations of Australians and our future ability to 
thrive in a new world driven by renewable energy sources. We believe that the interaction of these 
industries with our governments and the extreme imbalance between the way their rights are measured 
against the rights of others in the community is indicative of a system that is no longer working for all 
Australians and that has lost a moral and ethical compass. 
 
The Alliance added that its mission was “to hold our governments to account for past decisions regarding 
the operation of destructive fossil fuel industries and ensure that future decisions incorporate the rights of current 
and future generations of Australians to sustain their communities...” (LTGA website, accessed 22 June, 2012). 
 
In this context, LTGA’s diverse membership and sweeping aims need more than an anti coal-seam gas 
agenda to unite them.  As previously outlined, social identity theory is one way of explaining what that “glue” 
might be: a shared identity based on a perception that the alliance’s persona is that of a guardian preserving the 
environment, farmland and rural ways of life for the future. The more this preservationist manifesto is articulated 
by, and within, the alliance, the more differences between alliance members and mining companies and others are 
underscored. The mining companies are not only conceptually on the outer; they are to be physically placed outside 
locked gates and denied access to landholders’ property. They are positioned as predators, particularly urban 
predators, whose depredations may be irreversible and are therefore to be resisted.    
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Activities 
 
 
In addition to its website, LTGA operates a Facebook page and Twitter feeds. An indication of the spread 
of its activities is available on its website under the heading, Latest news (accessed 26 October, 2012). The news 
section describes how a  
 
week of action saw thousands of Australians take part in local events to protest the rapidly expanding 
unsustainable coal seam gas and coal mining industries that are threatening to do irreversible damage to our 
land, water and the health of our communities. 
 
The events included towns declaring, or moving towards declaring themselves CSG-free (Nattai, in the 
Sydney basin, and Poowong, in Victoria, respectively); thousands of people turning out to form two massive 
human signs spelling out “Stop CSG!” and “Protect H20, Stop CSG!”; a big “Rock the Gate” concert and a group 
called “The Knitting Nannas” hosted tours of “Gasino” (the town of Casino, home to coal seam gas mining 
company Metgasco). In addition, abseilers from six regions in Queensland dropped banners from a cliff at 
Kangaroo Point, Brisbane, protesting coal and coal seam gas encroachment. 
 
Day-to-day promotional and advocacy activities are indicated by the range of resources available on the 
LTGA website, such as a model advertisement for a rally in various centres; sample letters such as a generic letter 
to a Minister and a template letter of objection to coal seam gas exploration/production; copies of flyers in printer-
ready format; petitions, lists of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) to release coal seam gas; 
presentations; posters; white papers and even a state election “scorecard” to rate candidates by their position on 
LTGA issues. There are also sample parliamentary submissions, contact lists, and documents and links for 
registered LTGA members. 
 
 
Non-cooperation 
 
 
The Alliance’s platform does not promote negotiation as a desired outcome of its activities. According to 
Mr Hutton, “The core of the LTGA campaign is a non-cooperation campaign”; a “Ghandian style campaign” (pers 
comm 27 June, 2012). 
 
Mr Hutton reportedly told Rebecca Macfie that, “We’ve had farmers who have never broken the law in 
their lives, and who are some of the most conservative people in the country, stand on blockades and even get 
arrested … Our strategy is basically to harass [the gas companies], slow them down, make their lives as miserable 
as we possibly can, so that governments are forced to say there is a moratorium on until we are absolutely sure 
what the impacts are. And we’re going to narrow their [commercial] margins along the way (Macfie, 2012, 
para.5.)”  
 
In Mr Hutton’s view, the broader environmental movement has allowed its strength to be sapped through 
compromise: “[It] has been weakened almost to the point of not being able to campaign.  You don’t negotiate with 
the Government – that’s the last thing you’d do” (pers comm 27 June, 2012).  He is sceptical about industry and 
government assurances that environmental regulation and monitoring of the industry is robust, alleging that both 
the sector and the Government have a “suck it and see” approach that “throws the precautionary principle out the 
window … They simply don’t know what the impacts are going to be on people’s health or the water or land” 
(Macfie, 2012, para.6). His advice to people in New Zealand, where the Government aims to accelerate the 
development of oil and gas industries, was to “call on the Government to introduce a moratorium until all the 
research is done on the impacts” (Macfie, 2012, para. 7).  
 
LTGA is an alliance of groups with a broad sweep of concerns, identifying themselves with oppositional, 
activist positions on issues that go well beyond the immediate questions around coal resource development and coal 
seam gas mining. For example, an earlier version of their website (accessed 22 June, 2012) referred to the 
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possibility of falling property values and potential road damage and traffic hazards from the transport of heavy 
machinery. “Thousands of hectares of remnant vegetation will be destroyed…Losses will include endangered 
communities and the habitat of threatened species,” the website said. LTGA, therefore, is much more than a 
grassroots movement centred on a perceived need to mitigate a hazard-related risk or set of risks.  
 
Although the Alliance has asserted it is not against mining as such, it argues for application of the 
precautionary principle to prevent mining activities until they can be proven safe. As long as the relevant science 
on subjects such as fracking remains disputable, such a point may never be reached. Its own statements, whether 
via the website or its leader, characterise LTGA as a largely preservationist movement seeking its risk mitigation 
objectives in the context of a wider agenda to guard everything from prime agricultural land to wildlife and ways of 
life, such as those of farmers.  
 
The alliance’s approach is reminiscent of the preservation movement in the US, which emphasises 
protecting the environment for its own sake, rather than that of scientific conservationists, who were interested in 
saving the environment for human purposes (see 
http://library.thinkquest.org/26026/History/preservationists_versus_conser.html.) It is logical, therefore, for a 
preservationist movement to reject any responses to its activities that do not amount to a continuation of the status 
quo, as compromise would inevitably entail an agreed loss of some at least of what the is determined to keep safe. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
As previously described, reformative activist groups believe they can work with target organisations to 
achieve positive outcomes, while radical activists regard co-operation as a sell-out. While labels can be superficial 
and pejorative, it is useful to consider LTGA within that context. Derville (2005) says radical activist organisations 
manage their communications in ways that significantly differ from other organisations, and she offers this 
definition: 
 
A radical activist organisation is a group of two or more people who come together in opposition to 
something in their environment, including threats to the status quo: they work outside of the system to 
express their objections; influence social gaols, or both, through means such as agitative communication 
with key organisations that contribute to the phenomenon they oppose (p. 528) 
 
On this basis we suggest LTGA would be classified as radical.  The organisation is generally neither 
militant nor extremist, yet their policy of non-cooperation and no compromise is unambiguous. A Derville 
concludes, radical activists “view moderate approaches as ineffective compared with hard-line positions, and 
demand more ground than their targets are willing to give” (2005, p. 529). 
 
The issue under discussion here is not the merits or morality of this approach, but whether it is effective.  
By setting itself aside from establishment groups and moderate/reformative activists, LTGA has positioned itself 
outside the ambit of policy decision-making and influence. 
 
Its inclusive involvement of a wide variety of social, cultural, heritage and moral factors has widened its 
constituency but weakened its focus.   Accordingly, effort and expectation is committed to areas which are not on 
the immediate agenda of the principal actors in the issue. 
 
Moreover, LTGA’s strategy has little alignment or correspondence with the key proponents, regulators or 
moderate opponents. 
 
For instance, while LTGA purports to represent rural interests , the leading farmer associations have clearly 
stated that they do not oppose appropriate CSG development in principal and do not support a general farmer veto. 
Similarly, key local government organisations, which stand to benefit from rural jobs and regional investment, also 
support appropriate development, as do Federal and State governments and both main political parties. 
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We do not suggest that the social, cultural, heritage and moral factors embraced by the alliance are 
unimportant or insignificant.  But we do believe the result has been that LTGA has effectively dealt itself out of 
mainstream contention. 
 
 
Implications for PR practice 
 
 
From an activist viewpoint the LTGA example can be seen in two different ways – in terms of participation 
and identity, and in terms of policy effectiveness.  There is no doubt that LTGA has raised and mobilised a range of 
legitimate concerns and provides a focus for that nexus of issues.  Furthermore, by acting out against the enemy, 
activist organisations “declare themselves winners even when no social territory is gained because of member 
fulfilment” (Derville, 2005, p 530) 
 
However, in terms of effectiveness, the policy of non-cooperation appears to be a flawed approach. The 
Gandhian principle of non-cooperation -  which LTGA evokes – was a non-violent mass movement to end British 
rule in India (Bakshi, 1983). It aimed to bring Government to a standstill by withdrawing support for government 
institutions and a boycott of British goods. Its strength was a united mass population used in a “decidedly 
nationalistic context” (Ramanathan, 2006, p.235) against unfair and unjust government, which is hardly an 
appropriate comparison to the LTGA and its cause.  For a genuine grass-roots movement to be effective it needs to 
be relevant and connected, and focused on specific and readily expressed objectives. Politics is often described as 
the art of compromise, and the CSG issue is fundamentally a political issue. 
 
From a corporate/government perspective the CSG debate in Australia is largely a process of ”finding a 
way to make it work.”  There are many genuine, practical concerns, but the end-point is to develop the industry in 
what is seen as the national interest.   Major concerns raised by government and industry groups and reformative 
activists include encroachment on prime farm land; threats to surface and underground water; land access; 
sustainable food production; environmental emissions; compensation for land-holders; equitable sharing of 
royalties; and adverse impact on small communities. 
 
But all of these are presented as operational details which can be negotiated by using a mutual gains 
approach (Susskind & Field, 1996) as opposed to the ethical and moral issues predicated by the alliance.  
Meantime, apart from the state of Victoria where a moratorium remains in place, CSG exploration and 
development is proceeding, albeit cautiously.  By marginalizing itself, LTGA has become effectively isolated from 
any meaningful part of that negotiation, and this very important social and economic development seems likely to 
proceed without their participation. 
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Abstract 
 
 
This paper explores how the Confucian cultural background of students influences their perceptions of and reaction to the 
dominant public relations curriculum from the ‘West’. Using focus groups of Asian students, three heuristics that affect the 
students’ affinity to learn public relations are identified. Instructors working with students from a Confucian cultural 
background are advised to incorporate these heuristics when planning their curriculum. 
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Teaching Public Relations to Students with a Confucian Cultural Background. 
 
Globalization has led to the emergence of the Asian economies. Over the last 4 decades, they have 
increased their output tremendously while the scope of their business operations has expanded and now includes 
the management of multiple external relations.  Today, large Asian businesses operate on the principles that: a) 
they need to compete for the attention of customers, b) they are accountable for the quality of their products and, c) 
the public extends this accountability to all aspects of their business, including workplace conditions and service 
quality. These principles have also gained traction because of the simultaneous rise in the average level of 
education in Asian societies, and the increased access to information both from a technological and a cognitive 
standpoint. 
Not surprisingly, these operating principles have led to public relations becoming an increasingly important 
business function in the Asian ‘tiger economies’, one that is attracting more managerial resources, attention and 
workforce entrants each year. Tertiary institutions in many ‘Asian tiger’ countries have begun to incorporate public 
relations into their undergraduate social science and/or business curricula. While there are very few graduate 
programmes in corporate communication in Asian Universities, most programmes in mass communication or 
business administration include at least one course on public relations or public affairs. Additionally, courses in 
public opinion or persuasive communication are sometimes seen to provide public relations knowledge. 
Given the comparative recency of public relations as a business function in Asian economies, and the 
paradigmatic dominance of ‘Western’ concepts in academia, these courses, while taught in Asian Universities to an 
Asian student population, are often based on Western curriculum design standards (e.g. Commission on Public 
Relations Education, 2006, 2012), teaching materials and textbooks. Much has been written about the effects of 
cultural backgrounds on business interactions (Hofstede, 2005; Hall, 1976; House et al., 2004), on public relations 
(Gupta & Bartlett, 2007) as well as on education as a systemic purpose and a personal experience (De Bary, 1984, 
2007). No data yet exists though, about how a learner’s cultural background (whether it is an overt meta-model or 
merely a loose set of worldviews) frames and the affects teaching of public relations and its hitherto mostly 
Western pedagogical origins. The primary goal of this study is therefore to explore how Asian students’ cultural 
identity affects their affinity to learn public relations. It also aims to show how affinity (or the lack of it) can be 
integrated into the planning of a PR curriculum. 
 
Methodology 
 
The study faced a methodological challenge brought about by the fact that most Asian students are unlikely 
to point out any cultural distance between themselves and the course content, especially if doing so would give the 
impression that they were distancing themselves from - or even criticizing – their course instructors. Thus, we 
asked the students to reflect upon the differences between themselves and their fellow ‘Western’ students in the 
public relations course. The research question of this paper was:   
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How do Asian students demarcate their cultural identity from ‘the West’ when learning public relations?   
Focus group interviews were conducted with undergraduate Asian students after they had completed an 
introductory or advanced public relations course with students from Europe, the Americas, Australia or New 
Zealand. Each course employed a case-based, participant-centred pedagogy, where students interacted very 
regularly with each other in project groups as well as in plenary sessions. The courses and focus groups took place 
in tertiary institutions where participants were either exchange students (alongside ‘Western’ full-time students) or 
were enrolled full-time (alongside ‘Western’ exchange students). English was the language of instruction in all 
courses.  
The participants were between 21 and 27 years of age and came from China, Singapore, Taiwan and South 
Korea. The focus groups were conducted twice annually between 2005 and 2011, and once again in 2012. They 
took place in Germany (International School of Management), New Zealand (Unitec), Singapore (Singapore 
Management University) and Taiwan (National Taiwan University of Science and Technology). Importantly, the 
participants in the focus group were – with the exception of Asian students at Unitec- at least as proficient in 
English as their ‘Western’ counterparts (at ISM, Germany and NTUST, Taiwan) or spoke English as a native 
language (at SMU, Singapore). 
Six to nine Asian students were recruited for each focus group for what was termed ‘informal course feedback’ 
after the final course grades had been released to the students. Participants’ recruitment was a self-selection 
process, but focus groups reflected a range of performance scores, as well as both genders.  After providing general 
course feedback, the students were asked to comment on the following question: “How did you experience the 
collaboration with the exchange students from [country names] in this course?” (if the focus group participants 
were in their home University), or “How did you experience the collaboration with the students of [University 
name] in this course?” (if the focus group participants were exchange students). Participants were encouraged to 
give examples, elaborate on their observations, and – particularly when they observed differences – suggest 
underlying causes. Minutes of the each focus group were taken by the course’s teaching assistant for later 
evaluation. 
 
 
Results 
 
Three themes were surfaced from the comments of the focus group participants on their interactions with 
‘Western’ students and their view of the underlying causes of these perceived differences. These themes emerged 
unprompted in almost all the focus groups, and were quickly agreed upon whenever they were raised by a 
participant. They appeared to serve as quick, easily understood demarcations of the participants’ cultural identities 
and demonstrated how they stood apart from the ‘West’ with regard to learning public relations. We consequently 
proposed to label them ‘demarcation heuristics’. 
1. “PR is less important to us than to Western students”. Public relations as a profession is often held in low 
esteem by Asian students. Unlike ‘Western’ students, the focus group participants drew a sharp line 
between corporate behaviour and communication, or between action and words, with the latter being less 
important to them than the former.  The paradigm of a public relation curriculum – that all messages are 
part of the symbolic inter-action of organisations (Zorn, 2002) – seemed inherently ‘Western’ to them. 
Instead, the focus group participants agreed that “actions speak louder than words” and “the packaging 
isn’t as important as the content” to them as to the ‘Western’ students. 
 
2. “We’re not as good at communicating as Western students”. The Asian students seemed to display a 
different awareness of their skills (Holmes, 2004). Unlike ‘Western’ students, who rarely doubt their 
technical communication skills, the focus group participants often expressed relative ineptitude at crafting 
messages for the general public, and even more so at verbally conveying messages in public, in spite of 
their comparable English proficiency. The Asian students expressed that their ‘Western’ peers were 
naturally better equipped at talking, but some also derided them as “NATO – no action talk only”. They 
also pointed out that the industry’s most vocal practitioners and the most media savvy CEOs all seemed to 
have a ‘Western’ cultural background that was often far removed from their own.  
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3. “The Western case-studies are simplistic”. Although American and European case studies dominate tertiary 
teaching, the focus group participants did not criticise this regional bias. Instead, they questioned the cause-
and-effect style of narrative that is frequently adopted. Most case-studies revolve around key personae and 
their efforts to overcome strategic and operational obstacles. Asian students frequently remarked that 
companies are rarely “one-man-shows” (“It’s not like in Hollywood”). 
 
 
Analysis  
 
All focus group participants were socio-culturally from what the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004) calls 
‘Confucian societies’. They were highly self-aware of their Confucian upbringing, frequently referring to it in their 
attempts to meta-analyse the focus group’s conversations and two of their three demarcation heuristics. We hence 
employ the Confucian cultural background as an analytical framework.  
 
Confucianism is a normative model of society based on the understanding that each individual’s behaviour 
is expected to contribute ultimately to the establishment of an ideal society. Although Confucianism has been 
changed by millennia of human experience in increasingly complex societies, each with their own collective 
identities, it has maintained its core belief in the importance of establishing harmonious order. This order is 
metaphysical, but actualized and sustained by the efforts of humans. Individuals are thus expected to engage in a 
constant effort to cultivate themselves and improve their many relationships, thereby improving the harmonious 
balance in society.  
While relations are maintained by all parties under the Confucian framework, the superior is the entity that 
guarantees order and trust. Superiors do not have a metaphysical claim to their role, but their actions and decisions 
are meant to bring about the best outcome for as many subordinates as possible. In pursuing this goal, they are 
assumed to be pursuing the betterment of society as a whole. 
Scholars and sages such as Zhu Xi in the 12
th
 century and Wang Yangming in the 16
th
 century redefined 
and re-applied the key Confucian principles for their time. By today’s standards, these scholars were ‘opinion 
leaders’ for the collective identities of their societies. Although not primarily a scholar, Yu Dan comes closest to 
being the current opinion leader for Confucianism. She is a household name in Chinese communities and is the face 
and author of TV-series and bestselling books on the ‘Analects’ of Confucius (Dan, 2006, 2010). 
Not surprisingly, given the nature of TV and international bestsellers, this popular version of Confucianism 
makes few references to metaphysics, focusing instead on self-improvement. It calls for every person to be at least 
the best version of herself and ideally a junzi (literally ‘lord’s son’, or gentleman). A junzi has a profound 
personality and remains wary of pettiness and parochialism. A person of deeds, rather than of words, he is ‘halting 
in speech, but quick in action’ (Analects IV) and knows when it is better to remain respectfully silent in a 
relationship. Moderation is his general approach to life, and is particularly important when he is pursuing an 
advantage or portraying himself to others. He will not meddle in matters of the state, public issues or anything for 
which he does not have immediate responsibility or authority.  
This quotidian form of Confucianism can explain at least two of the three demarcation heuristics used by 
Chinese, South-Korean, Taiwanese and Singaporean students enrolled in PR courses. That they purport to attach 
less value to communication and more to action than their ‘Western’ peers is in accordance with the normative 
distinction that Confucianism draws between speaking and doing. This is particularly true for public relations with 
its inherently persuasive nature and its benefits to the organisation rather than to society. Likewise, the focus group 
participants’ self-perceived lack of communication aptitude reflects the low priority that Confucianism accords it. 
When queried, all participants blamed their ‘Confucian education’ for their allegedly underdeveloped 
communication talent.  
Students did not ascribe their difficulty in relating to ‘Western’ case studies to their Confucian 
socialization. Nevertless, the relational thinking they found missing is indeed prevalent in Confucian cultures, 
where harmony means establishing and balancing relationships in all directions, and all the time. Accordingly, Y.K 
Chung, one of the founders of the public relations profession in Taiwan, defines public relations as “cultivating 
understanding and harmony to achieve prosperity” (Freitag & Quesinberry Stokes, 2009, p. 157).  
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Implications for PR education 
 
This study retains a caveat, in that it assessed neither the intensity, nor the centrality of Confucian values 
for each participating student individually. We instead assumed that cultural origin was an antecedent variable for 
all students when learning public relations. Similarly, we could not discern if there was an impact in the reverse 
direction: the interaction with ‘Western’ students over ‘Western’ concepts could have affected students’ Confucian 
self-identity or their propensity to reflect upon it. Hence, future research will need to embed the focus group 
methodology in pre- and post-tests to possibly validate the demarcation heuristics observed here.    
 
At least two of the three demarcation heuristics will likely impact the efficacy with which public relations 
is taught to students with a Confucian cultural background. It does not necessarily make it more difficult, but the 
heuristics indicate that instructors may need to take an approach that is somewhat different from what most 
textbooks purport. Calls to make education and thought leadership in public relations more diverse are not new, but 
mostly have a macroscopic perspective. Hence, even though increasing cultural diversity has long been a feature of 
public relations research (e.g. Sriramesh & Vercic, 2009), increasing cultural diversity in public relations 
classrooms can only be a first and general principle (Creedon & Al-Khaja, 2005) as the demarcation heuristics have 
a more immediate relation to curriculum design.  
Firstly - and very early in a public relations course - a holistic understanding of PR should be established 
that prevents the discipline from being misperceived as ‘just communication’. Educators should instead familiarize 
Confucian learners with the concept of reputation as the result of an organisation’s actions as well as its messages. 
Secondly, technical exercises in messaging and speaking (up) are best conducted continuously throughout course, 
not so much to improve students’ personal communication skills, but rather their self-confidence.  
More generally – and not ascribed to their cultural background by the participants of this study -  the 
concept of multiple stakeholder relations might well be inherently plausible to learners with a Confucian cultural 
background. Hence, PR and other business processes are likely to be understood by Confucian learners as resulting 
from multiple relationships, rather than from an individual’s or organisation’s actions, as is often the case in 
‘Western’ teaching materials (Gupta & Bartlett, 2007). This means that a course can be based on the paradigm of 
stakeholder management, with case studies (or other teaching materials) illustrating multi-polarity and networked 
management rather than the actions of individual business personae and their effects.  
Lastly, PR- educators need to allow for meta-communication to take place in the classroom and for 
students to discuss on an ad hoc basis how their affinity to public relations is affected by their cultural background. 
When this is allowed to become the subject of reflective classroom discourse, future practitioners will be better able 
to function with the cultural ‘other’ (George, 2003). Such encounters which will only increase with the further 
growth of Asian economies. 
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Abstract 
 
The power of public relations to shape community attitudes is well documented but with it comes professional 
responsibility. Mental illness and suicide are two key social issues requiring the profession of public relations to 
consider its role. This paper reports on the development process and pilot evaluation of a federally funded 
educational initiative designed to empower public relations undergraduates to consider the impact of 
communication on public understandings of, and responses to specific social and health issues.  While the 
curriculum materials focus on mental illness and suicide, the process has application to other areas of social 
responsibility. The curriculum resources reflect the model of empowerment and capacity building, avoiding 
proscription or censorship but offering emerging practitioners tools and knowledge to make their own informed 
decisions about the way in which they can responsibly communicate in practice. 
 
 
Keywords: Public Relations, Community Attitudes, Professional Responsibility, Social Issues, Mental Illness. 
 
 
Public Relations and Social Impact: The Challenge for Responsible Practice 
 
There is on-going international interest in the impact of certain forms of communication about suicide and mental 
illness; however Australia is the first country to integrate a program dedicated to public relations practice into its 
mental health or suicide prevention strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).  While many countries 
internationally have developed media guidelines that promote responsible reporting of suicide and in some cases 
mental illness (for example, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand  and Hong 
Kong),  a more comprehensive approach has been taken in Australia by working with a range of other sectors (such 
as the mental health sector, police and courts) and by including this material in the undergraduate training of 
journalism students (Pirkis, Blood, Beautrais, Burgess, & Skehan, 2006;Skehan et al., 2009). Addressing the role of 
public relations professionals, through undergraduate training is internationally innovative and so evaluation of its 
effectiveness is significant.   
 
Research shows that certain representations of suicide may increase the risk of copycat behaviour among 
vulnerable people
 
(Pirkis & Blood, 2010). There is also concern that people living with a mental illness are 
predominantly portrayed in a negative and stereotypical way, which may increase stigma and discrimination 
(Francis et al., 2001).  The Australian Government’s response to this evidence was the establishment of the 
Mindframe National Media Initiative, funded under the National Suicide Prevention Strategy to encourage 
responsible, accurate and sensitive media representation of mental illness and suicide (Skehan, Sheridan-Burns, & 
Hazell, 2009).  
 
While many may argue that the potential for public relations practitioners to influence media content is limited, 
studies on the effect of public relations on the media have found that almost half of the articles published in major 
metropolitan media are the result of public relations activity with some media content as high as 70 per cent 
(Macnamara, 1993; Zawawi, 1994, 2001). Australian studies also show that while the reporting of both suicide and 
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mental illness is improving in quality in Australia, the number of reports have more than doubled, indicating 
increased media attention (Pirkis, Blood, Dare, & Holland, 2008). Increased media attention is likely to lead to 
increased public relations practice, both in a reactive manner and proactively through development of health 
communication campaigns to influence community attitudes and behaviour. It could be argued that mental health 
issues are more likely to be a focus of activity for practitioners in the future; necessitating further attention to this 
area in pre-service education and professional development. 
 
This paper presents a rationale for including public relations in any national strategy to address media reporting and 
portrayal of suicide and mental illness.  It also outlines the developmental process for a curriculum approach and 
reports on evaluation data from seven institutions that completed a pilot of the program.  
 
Why consider the role of public relations?  
 
Public relations practice has an impact on health and social issues, just as important social issues inevitably have an 
impact, either directly or indirectly, on public relations practice. Public relations is potentially powerful in shaping 
public opinion, and can have a significant impact on community attitudes and behaviour (Bowen, 2005).  This 
impact may be even greater for complex social issues such as mental illness and suicide where evidence suggests 
that, despite improvements, community understanding is generally poor. This lack of understanding leads to 
confusion, fear, misconceptions, stereotyping and discrimination of those living with a mental illness (Barney, 
Griffiths, Christensen, & Jorm, 2009; Hocking, 2003; Jorm, Korten, Jacomb, Christensen, & Henderson, 1999; 
Wahl, 1999). 
 
The power to influence, points to the need for public relations practitioners to have a broader view of ethical 
standards and practice that include the welfare of specific publics and “to act…in a socially responsible way” 
(Starck & Kruckeberg, 2003, p. 37; Fitzpatrick & Gauthier, 2001). As Fitch (2012) and others argue, the social 
impact of public relations practice should be measured beyond business practice and corporate ethics alone, to 
consider community and society more broadly. Communication can at times “require some limits and careful 
consideration of… how to influence target audiences” considering both harms and benefits of that communication 
(Fitzpatrick & Gauthier, 2001, p. 206). 
 
There is possibly no better illustration of these ethical considerations than with the issues of mental illness and 
suicide. Mental illness and suicide are complex and emotional issues that affect many stakeholders. Mental 
illnesses and mental health problems are common in the Australian community. Research suggests that one in five 
people will be directly affected by mental illness in any 12-month period with many more indirectly affected as a 
family member, friends or colleague (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). Official data also suggest that just over 
2,000 people die by suicide each year in Australia, with many more attempting to take their own lives. This has 
devastating effects on family, friends, colleagues and potentially the whole community. The way both suicide and 
mental illness are discussed is important, especially where that discussion occurs through the mass media or other 
public means (Pirkis & Blood, 2010; Francis, Pirkis, Dunt, & Blood, 2001). 
 
Without appropriate consideration of responsible practice, public relations practice could reinforce the 
discriminatory attitude of a largely uninformed general public/society, generating further alienation of those most 
vulnerable. Alternatively, public relations practice that considers the potential impact of these issues on 
communities and stakeholders.  PR could empower publics and assist in breaking down stigma associated with 
mental illness and in reducing potential harm to those who are vulnerable to suicide or impacted by suicide. 
 
Public relations practitioners need to be conscious of the powerful messages that certain images, symbols, pictures 
and words are conveying to publics about mental health issues. It is often too easy to use emotive words or images 
or to escalate an issue through the use of certain statistics to gain interest in an issue or promote a particular client. 
The practitioner, however,  needs to be aware that images and words can perpetuate negative and inaccurate 
stereotypes about mental illness or place people who are vulnerable to suicide at increased risk by providing 
specific details about suicide, such as the method or location of a death or deaths (Francis et al., 2001; Pirkis & 
Blood, 2010). Public relations practitioners need to make choices about the ethical use of language and understand 
its potential impact on those who may be vulnerable. Is there a case example where this was illustrated? 
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Public relations practitioners are also uniquely placed to advance the needs of certain publics when armed with 
appropriate knowledge and skills to navigate the interface between vulnerability, communication, risk and 
advocacy. To achieve this level of skill, public relations practitioners require relevant education and training to 
enact their communication roles within a socially responsible framework. The Public Relations Institute of 
Australia outlines the importance of such a framework in mandating the consideration of social and ethical 
implications of public relations practice within tertiary education as a prerequisite for accreditation (Public 
Relations Institute of Australia, 2012).  
 
A Curriculum Approach: Engaging with Educators to Build Relevant Resources 
 
As the largest focus for tertiary study in public relations, the undergraduate degree provides an ideal opportunity to 
expose future practitioners to social issues and dilemmas and provide them with guided opportunities to understand 
and navigate complex ethical challenges. Public relations educators, however, need to find practical and relevant 
ways to introduce these concepts as part of their teaching program. 
 
Response Ability for Public Relations (rebranded as Mindframe for public relations in December 2012) was 
developed in partnership with public relations educators and professionals. It includes a set of flexible multi-media 
curriculum resources that were based on a successful curriculum program used in the undergraduate training of 
journalism students (Skehan et al., 2009). While the resources use mental illness and suicide as the topics to be 
explored, the resources have been developed in a way as to expose students to authentic learning tasks in public 
relations, such as engaging with real-world case-studies and discussing critical social issues that build the students’ 
understanding and skills for future practice. 
 
Given that these curriculum resources were internationally innovative, public relations educators from around 
Australia were consulted before the development of the materials to ensure that the resources would be relevant and 
useful. The project team at the Hunter Institute of Mental Health conducted semi-structured telephone interviews 
with 23 public relations educators to determine: (a) whether mental illness, suicide or related topics were currently 
covered in the public relations curriculum; (b) the type of information educators would find useful, and (c) the 
potential barriers to future uptake. The interviews were conducted with universities (60%), TAFE campuses (22%), 
private colleges (9%) and the Public Relations Institute of Australia (9%). 
 
The consultation revealed that public relations programs varied, but programs were all structured around core 
public relations skills and generally did not offer any topic-based subjects. Despite this, some educators indicated 
that mental health could be included as a campaign example or a student assignment: “They [mental health topics] 
are covered as case studies where the lecturer thinks they are relevant and appropriate… It’s really a matter of 
incorporating whatever issues are current or the lecturer feels will get the interest of students.” In addition, several 
educators noted students’ interest in the topics of mental health and mental illness. When students were offered the 
opportunity to choose their own topic, many reflected that mental health issues were a very popular choice: “I 
know when students get to choose their own subjects, a number of them choose mental health…so there is interest 
out there, but I don’t think it should be a subject in itself.” 
 
The consultations revealed a strong preference for curriculum resources that were specifically tailored for public 
relations practice, rather than for redeveloping the current Mindframe or Response Ability resources. However, 
similar to Australian journalism educators, there was a strong preference for problem-based learning approaches 
with topical and relevant case-studies that could enhance student learning of public relations practice while also 
exposing students to an area that involved management of a sensitive social issue (Skehan et al., 2009). 
Respondents noted that supporting materials and background documents would also be required to ensure that 
educators could teach, not only practical skills and tactics, but be in an informed position to address the social 
responsibility, ethical dilemmas and practical challenges that communication about suicide and mental illness 
involves. 
 
Educators noted that barriers to uptake would include space within the curriculum to address the issues, a 
perception that mental illness and suicide may not be the core business of public relations as well as staff 
discomfort at raising sensitive issues in a classroom setting. Given the prevalence of mental illness and suicide, and 
the reported misinformation that exists in the community, educators believed they would require additional support 
to cover the topics well.  Educators did, however, believe that these barriers could be managed as long as the 
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resources were of high quality, easy to use, relevant and provided enough guidance to educators in handling the 
content areas. 
 
It was clear from consultations with public relations educators that a curriculum approach for public relations 
programs would need to be flexible and developed in a way that they could be used at various points in the 
curriculum and in a range of subject areas such as ethics, crisis communication, issues management, media 
relations and campaign development, to name a few. The resources would also need to be based on core public 
relations skills, rather than on trying to teach students about mental illness or suicide specifically. 
 
The model of curriculum development already trialed under the Mindframe National Media Initiative was 
translated for use in public relations education; maintaining the inherent problem-based learning design (Skehan et 
al., 2007, 2009; Greenhalgh & Hazell, 2005; Sheridan-Burns & Hazell, 1998). Problem-based learning models have 
been used elsewhere for the study of ethics and related subjects within tertiary public relations courses (Slattery, 
2002; Erzikova, 2010).  In this way, a problem is posed and serves as the context for new learning. To be 
successful however, it needs to be grounded in real world or authentic contexts (Slattery, 2002). 
 
The resources were developed as an online package and include a core document for students, lecture slides and 
notes, and six case-studies including video and other multi-media materials. The case-studies are the practical 
components of the resources and include group work, activities and written exercises that promote what Hutchison 
described as “active learning”; laying strong foundations for skills proficiency (2002, p. 302). The public relations 
curriculum resources were developed in partnership with an expert working group of public relations educators and 
industry representatives who assisted the project team to ensure all exercises and activities were based on ‘real-
world’ scenarios. One case study, for example, involves crisis communication about the suicide death of a young 
person with implications for a number of organisations involved. Other case studies involved the development of a 
mental health campaign to promote help-seeking behaviour and planning an event to raise awareness of mental 
illness and engage publics. The case-study and lecture materials are supported by information to assist educators in 
using the materials and discussing sensitive issues with students, as well as a range of fact sheets that provide 
background context, facts and statistics, and summaries of research evidence. Refer to www.mindframe-media.info 
for access to the curriculum resources.  
 
The curriculum resources reflect the model of empowerment and capacity building suggested by Baker and 
Martinson (2002), avoiding proscription or censorship but offering emerging practitioners tools and knowledge to 
make their own informed decisions about the way in which they can responsibly communicate about mental illness 
and suicide in practice. 
 
 
Usefulness and Relevance of the Curriculum Approach: Pilot Study 
 
A pilot study was run to determine the acceptability and usefulness of the resources to both educators and students. 
The study also sought to assess the impact of resource-use on students’ knowledge and attitudes to communication 
about suicide and mental illness. The results of the pilot study were used to identify areas of resource improvement 
and ways that the resources might best articulate into a public relations course before full dissemination to all 
relevant Australian tertiary institutions. 
 
Seven universities and technical colleges responded to an invitation to pilot the Response Ability for Public 
Relations resources. Members of the pilot group were sent the Response Ability for Public Relations resources, 
which included a DVD containing the video clips for case studies and copies of other supporting case study 
materials. For the remainder of the resources—having been designed as online materials—the pilot group was 
directed to the home website. The website contains a ‘User’s Guide’ for instruction on using the resources. 
 
The seven Australian tertiary institutions that participated in the pilot study were based in New South Wales (3), 
Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia and included five universities and two TAFE 
Campuses. Each tertiary institution used the Response Ability materials with students and completed evaluation 
components. Students (n = 198) from across first, second and third year subjects received the materials. Measures 
for the pilot study included semi-structured telephone interviews with educators who piloted the resources as well 
Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal, Vol 13(2), 2012 
 
54 
 
as pre (Time One) and post (Time Two) student surveys measures to assess change in knowledge and attitudes, and 
to gauge views and opinions about the materials and the topic. 
 
Resource Usage 
 
Educators reported using the materials across all years of study, although most used the materials in a second or 
third year course. Educators indicated that the resources were used in “Ethics”, “Public Relations and the Media” 
and “Campaign” related subjects. The materials were used predominantly in tutorials or as an individual assessment 
for students. 
 
While all six case studies were used at least once in the pilot, the most popular case-studies were: (a) Case Study 1 
(50%) dealing with a suicide incident that could be used for crisis management, media relations and related topics; 
and (b) Case Study 3 (50%) which was based on a mental health campaign. Most respondents (75%) indicated that 
they had used the core background document for students, Issues and Impact and the planning document for 
educators, Discussing Sensitive Issues. 
 
Relevance, Usefulness, Quality and Ease of Use 
 
Educators were asked to separately rate the relevance, usefulness, ease of use and quality of the resources in their 
teaching. Educators generally rated each of the resource components as “very relevant” or “relevant” with only one 
educator rating the fact sheets as only “somewhat relevant”. All educators gave a rating of “very useful” or “useful” 
and all educators rated the resources as “very easy” to use. A majority of the educators (75%) also rated the quality 
of both the content and the presentation of the resources as “excellent”. 
 
 Educators commented that the resources were of high quality, useful and easy for them to use and thought that 
students also found them useful and easy to use. Positive comments were generally related to the limited 
preparation required, the applicability of the material to the subjects, and the quality of the materials. For instance, 
one educator commented: “The quality of the [information] and the way it is presented is very good… puts it in a 
format which makes it easy to transfer into a course and then be able to teach” and another:  “Most of our students 
are distance educations and the fact I didn’t get one question about the assignment… indicates there were no issues 
and I didn’t really have to provide a lot of guidance.” 
 
Flexible Enough for my Students to Use in a Way That Was Meaningful to Them 
 
A majority of students (84%) “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the information presented in the lecture or tutorial 
on ‘appropriate communication about mental illness and suicide’ was relevant to their public relations study. A 
majority of students (86%) also “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the information presented in the lecture and/or 
tutorial was interesting. 
 
Survey measures pre- and post-exposure to the resources, indicated that students generally agreed that public 
relations practice can impact on health and social issues, including mental illness and suicide. Additionally, 
students generally agreed that public relations practitioners needed to have some level of responsibility for the 
impact of their campaign or communication. 
 
Knowledge and Confidence 
 
Educators were asked to self-rate their knowledge of the issues related to appropriate communication about mental 
illness and suicide, both pre- and post-exposure to the Response Ability resources. Ratings ranged from 1 (poor) to 
5 (excellent) across both knowledge and confidence ratings. 
 
All educators (100%) gave a “neutral” rating of knowledge before exposure to the resources (M = 3.00), with 
improvements to self-reported knowledge following exposure to the resources (M = 4.25). Educators also rated 
their confidence in teaching about these issues as “neutral” (M = 3.00) before exposure but showed an increase in 
self-reported confidence following exposure to the resources (M = 4.00). 
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All participants (100%) indicated they felt they were provided with enough support to implement the pilot and all 
participants indicated that they planned to use the resources again in the future and would recommend the resources 
to other educators: “We will use the resources over a number of subjects…and adapt them to the course. 
The resources were more helpful than I thought they would be.” Despite the generally positive feedback from 
educators, they did highlight issues of concern relating to crowded curriculum and the currency of the resources 
over time as issues change: “The barrier is not the materials, the barrier is organising your semester or course to 
accommodate it and working out how much you can fit in. Issues become more complex. In three or four years you 
will need to see what the current issues are.” 
 
Students were asked to rate from 0 (strongly agree) to 3 (strongly disagree) their confidence in their ability to 
communicate about mental illness and suicide following the lecture or tutorial. The majority of students (79%) 
indicated that they either “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that their confidence had increased, while a minority 
indicated that they (19%) “disagreed” or (2%) “strongly disagreed”. 
 
 Students were asked to rate their agreement from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree), with the statement: “I 
feel I have had enough knowledge regarding appropriate communication about suicide to avoid my practice 
causing any harm to vulnerable members of the community.” Prior to being exposed to the resource over half of all 
participants indicated they “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the above statement, whereas only 31% of 
participants assigned a rating of “disagree” or “strongly disagree” after exposure. A paired t-test showed that 
student’s level of agreement prior exposure to the resource (M = 1.41) was significantly different to their level of 
agreement after exposure (M = 1.74, p < .05).  
 
Students were asked to rate their agreement from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree), with the statement: “I 
feel I have had enough knowledge regarding appropriate communication about mental illness to avoid my practice 
causing any harm to vulnerable members of the community.” Prior to being exposed to the resource over half of all 
participants indicated they “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the above statement, whereas only 30% of 
participants assigned a rating of “disagree” or “strongly disagree” after exposure. A paired t-test showed that 
student’s level of agreement prior exposure to the resource (M = 1.44) was significantly different to their level of 
agreement after exposure (M = 1.74, p < .05). 
 
Additional questions to assess student knowledge in the pilot study were flawed, with students misinterpreting 
some questions and answering them in relation to “personal communication” to people they thought may be at risk 
rather than “professional communication”. Assessment of changes in student knowledge is needed in future 
research. 
 
 
Conclusions and Ways Forward 
 
The power and influence, and indeed the reputation, of the public relations profession require an ethical standard of 
practice that is responsible, accurate and considered. This is true of many issues and areas that will be encountered 
by practitioners in the professional realm. If practice is considered, it can have positive impacts in terms of 
increasing engagement with and awareness of important social issues such as suicide and mental illness. Done 
without care and consideration, the impacts for publics directly affected, such as those living with a mental illness 
or vulnerable to suicide, can be harmful and at worst, life threatening. 
 
For public relations education to maintain relevance and usefulness in relation to the demands of practice, both the 
philosophical principles of ethical conduct, as well as providing opportunity for practical skills-development and 
experience must be introduced. For educators and institutions seeking to produce these capabilities in graduates, 
resources should respond to the sector’s needs in their design, relevance and currency. The Response Ability 
[Mindframe] for Public Relations learning suite has been developed with the needs of educators, students as well as 
those of sector professionals and marginalised publics in mind. 
 
Evaluation conducted in the university context has indicated that there is a place for the material within public 
relations education. Despite some limitations in measuring the impact of the resources on student knowledge to 
date, educators and students have recognised the resources as being useful and relevant and have self-reported that 
the resources have impacted on improved confidence and knowledge. In endeavouring to empower students with 
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the skills and knowledge to communicate responsibly about mental illness and suicide, the logical next step for this 
project is to conduct more comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the materials on student knowledge and skill. 
Beyond this, there would be value in estimating the potential impact of the curriculum resources on future 
professional practice of those that were exposed to the materials in their undergraduate training. 
 
Fitch (2012) conducted a further evaluation of the Response Ability [Mindframe] materials and ethical practice with 
a cohort of students at one university. The author made a number of recommendations about both the place of these 
issues in public relations curricula, but also in regards to the nature of their inclusion. In particular, Fitch argues 
that there is a need to scaffold materials into the assessment schedule to best contextualise learning and provide 
real-time client experiences that ensure students can apply the principles taught in the materials. The materials will 
also need to respond to the cultural diversity of many university programs and ensure the materials integrate the 
opportunities and challenges that the new media environment may present for public relations practice (Fitch, 2012; 
Makau & Arnett, 1997). Of particular interest to communication studies, it has been argued that globalisation and 
new media have contributed to an ever-increasing need for a diverse, flexible and effective ethical education 
(Austin & Toth, 2011; Starck & Kruckeberg 2003; Makau & Arnett, 1997). The Response Ability [Mindframe] for 
Public Relations project has maintained currency and responded to emerging issues through the development of 
new case study material that incorporates dilemmas facing practitioners in managing media technologies and 
environments. The relative benefit and risks associated with communicating about mental illness and suicide using 
new technologies is under-researched posing challenges for both the public relations and health sectors and 
requiring further examination (Pirkis & Blood, 2010).  This is an area for future investigation under the Mindframe 
National media initiative.  
 
As the speed of communication changes, so too must the provisions of both educational and professional support, 
in order to maintain an empowered profession that leads by example and advocates on behalf of marginalised 
publics and their safety. While the Mindframe program has collaborated with the peak industry body, the Public 
Relations Institute of Australia, further work is needed to link the curriculum approach to industry skills and 
standards. An approach that integrates both undergraduate and professional support across all related sectors – 
health, public relations and media – will have more power to positively influence publics and contribute to the 
promotion of mental health and wellbeing and to the prevention of suicide. 
 
 Note: Since this pilot study was completed, the curriculum resources for public relations will be rebranded as 
Mindframe for Public Relations Education and all resources will be located on the Mindframe website at 
www.mindframe-media.info 
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